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At present, there are about 26 ongoing armed self-
determination conflicts.  Some are simmering at a lower level 
of irregular or terrorist violence; others amount to more regular 
internal armed conflicts, with secessionist groups maintaining 
control over significant swathes of territory to the exclusion of 
the central government.  In addition to these active conflicts, it 
is estimated that there are another 55 or so campaigns for self-
determination, which may turn violent if left unaddressed, with 
another 15 conflicts considered provisionally settled but at risk 
of reignition.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a world that includes the following independent countries: 
Biafra, Chechnya, Katanga, Kosovo, Quebec, and South Ossetia.  All of 
these territories have made bids to become independent states.  All but one of 
these failed in their quests, and the status of the one exception, Kosovo, 
remains controversial.  Understandably, states oppose groups that attempt to 
break away from their parent state.  International law reflects this negative 
stance on secession movements. Colonialism provides a legally recognized 
exception to maintaining territorial integrity.  International law has come to 
recognize the right of colonial peoples to create independent states, that is, a 
right to external self-determination.  Only recently have courts even 
entertained secessionist claims. 
While courts such as the International Court of Justice and the Supreme 
Court of Canada have only recently (and reluctantly) entertained the legality 
of secession, jurists and other scholars have put forth a number of secession 
models for courts to adopt. Some jurists use functionality as a criterion for 
secession: If a territory can function as an independent state, then 
international law should recognize the seceding state.2  Other jurists 
emphasize cultural preservation: If a territory has a culture distinct from its 
parent state, then international law should recognize the right of a seceding 
territory to preserve its culture.3  Still other jurists focus on the economic 
gulf between territorial units of a state: If one province basically subsidizes 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Marc Weller, Settling Self-Determination Conflicts: Recent Developments, 20 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 111, 112 (2009). 
 2 See infra Part III.B. 
 3 See infra Part III.C. 
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the rest of a state, then international law should recognize the right of that 
province to secede.4 
The final model, which has recently received the greatest attention from 
courts and jurists, treats secession as a remedy for injustices.  If a parent state 
has thwarted attempts at internal self-determination and inflicted grave harms 
on a group residing in a distinct territory within its borders, then international 
law should recognize a right to secede.  This Article proposes and defends 
this Remedial Model of secession.5 
Kosovo’s recent unilateral declaration of independence (UDL)6 provides 
an excellent opportunity to reconsider grounds for secession and to test the 
Remedial Model.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ), however, fell 
back on the rather unimpressive conclusion that Kosovo’s declaration did not 
violate international law.7  What follows is not a doctrinal analysis of the 
ICJ’s decision.  Rather, the analysis consists of making a normative proposal 
of what the ICJ should have said.  The power of this approach will become 
more evident through comparisons of Kosovo’s claims to those of other 
secessionist movements, historical and current.  
Part II describes background information on Kosovo before presenting 
the elements of a Remedial Model.  Throughout this Part, the Model is tested 
against actual secessionist claims, past and current.  Part III, then, compares 
the Remedial Model to other ones found in the literature, including previous 
versions of the Remedial Model.  Part IV takes on the challenge of how to 
implement the Remedial Model, other than through the ICJ.  This Article 
concludes with a case for elevating the role of human rights treaty bodies, 
particularly the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), regarding secession claims. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL LAW, SECESSION, AND KOSOVO 
A.  Background on the Kosovo Decision  
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo’s parliament took the bold step of 
declaring Kosovo’s independence.8  Serbia submitted a request to the United 
                                                                                                                   
 4 See infra Part III.D. 
 5 See infra Part III.A. 
 6 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (Kos. 2008).  
 7 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, para. 84 (July 22) [hereafter Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion]. 
 8 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (Kos. 2008).   
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Nations General Assembly to have the ICJ issue an advisory opinion, and the 
General Assembly obliged, asking the following question: “Is the [UDL] by 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance 
with international law?”9  The ICJ answered that “general international law 
contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence.”10  The 
ICJ explicitly dodged the question as to whether international law sanctions a 
remedial right to secession.11  Indeed, as Judge Bruno Simma bemoaned in 
his dissent, the ICJ missed a rare opportunity to present a much more 
sweeping analysis.12  While some have called the ICJ decision judicious, if 
not momentous, many jurists have found it disappointing.13  Effectively, and 
somewhat facetiously, the ICJ’s decision means that the decision by the City 
Council of Killington, Vermont in 2005 and 2006 to secede from Vermont 
and join New Hampshire did not violate international law.14  More 
charitably, Curtis Doebbler, a law professor, wrote one of the first academic 
reactions to the decision, predicting that “it is unlikely to be remembered as 
one of the Court’s better attempts to articulate and clarify the law.”15  
Another failing of the opinion is that the ICJ examined the factual 
circumstances only going back to 1999.16  The analysis developed below fills 
in the gaps and directly addresses these important issues.17  
                                                                                                                   
 9 G.A. Res. 63/3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008). 
 10 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 7, para. 84. 
 11 Id. para. 83. 
 12 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, paras. 6–7 (July 22) (separate opinion 
of Judge Simma). 
 13 Curtis Doebbler, Op-Ed., The ICJ Kosovo Independence Opinion: Uncertain Precedent, 
JURIST (July 23, 2010), http://jurist.org/forum/2010/07/the-icj-kosovo-independence-ruling-an 
-uncertain-precedent.php.  For an overview, see, e.g., Roland Tricot & Barrie Sander, Recent 
Developments: The Broader Consequences of the International Court of Justice’s Advisory 
Opinion on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 49 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 321, 336–45 (2011) (contrasting the narrow court opinion with the broader 
consequences of the case). 
 14 See Brian M. Lusignan, One of These Things Is Not Like the Others?: A Comparative 
Analysis of Secessionist Movements in Vermont, Quebec, Hawai’i and Kosovo 36–37 (Jan. 
2009) (unpublished comment), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti 
cle=1002&context=brian_lusignan (placing Vermont’s independence movement within larger 
international secession debate). 
 15 Doebbler, supra note 13. 
 16 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 7, paras. 57–77. 
 17 See infra Part II.C. 
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B.  Legal Analysis 
The following is an outline of how a court or some international decision 
maker (such as the human rights treaty bodies, especially CERD18 or the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC)) should have and should approach 
secession claims.19  A court should engage in a three-step inquiry.  In the first 
stage, it should evaluate the relationship between the two parties—the 
claimant entity and the parent state.  That finding is a prerequisite to all 
subsequent analyses because the court must first establish that a secessionist 
relationship exists between the parties before it.  The next two stages of the 
analysis assess the harms perpetrated by the parent state against the seceding 
territory and its people.  In these stages, the inquiry should focus first on the 
removal of self-determination and second on gross human rights violations.  
When considering a secessionist claim, a court should address the 
following three questions: 
1. Is the claimant a state-like territory that represents its 
people and seeks independence from a parent state, 
which itself has a lawful claim on the claimant entity? 
(Relational Factors)20 
2. Has the claimant attempted to exercise internal self-
determination, and has the parent state seriously 
thwarted those efforts? (Internal Self-
Determination)21 
3. Has the claimant suffered or been threatened with 
harms that rise to the level of peremptory 
prohibitions? (Group Harm)22 
This Article addresses each question separately below. 
C.  Relational Factors  
The first question assesses the relationship between the claimant entity 
and the parent state.  Basically, if a state is claiming to secede, then the court 
                                                                                                                   
 18 See infra Part IV.B. 
 19 For the sake of brevity, the term “court” will be used hereafter as shorthand for “court or 
international decision maker.” 
 20 See infra Part II.C. 
 21 See infra Part II.D. 
 22 See infra Part II.E. 
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should ask this question: What is seceding from what?  A claim to secession 
presupposes that one political entity or territory is a legitimate part of another 
political territory.  The court, therefore, needs a preliminary assessment of 
the nature of the parent state’s relation to the claimant, as well as the nature 
of the claimant entity.  The latter investigation is not a determination per se 
of whether the claimant constitutes a state under international law.  Rather, it 
is a determination of whether the claimant is state-like—that is, whether it 
has the indices of a state.23  If it does not, then there is no reason for the court 
to go any further.  Take a more extreme case: If an ethnic group scattered 
throughout its parent state and not concentrated in any specific territory 
claims independence, then the court should immediately dismiss the claim.  
Biafra’s secession claim, as shown below, brought this issue into bold 
relief.24 
The history of the Former Yugoslavia illustrates the importance of these 
relational factors.  The relational status of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 
proved critical in assessing the legal viability of their independence claims. 
The Badinter Arbitration Commission deemed it important that these 
political entities were lawfully recognized republics within the SFRY.25  This 
put their independence claims within a dissolution context rather than within 
a secession context.  Since by July 1992 the SFRY did not exist, then there 
was nothing for these republics to secede from.26  Unsurprisingly, these 
republics did not secede.  Instead, the parent state dissolved.  However, this 
convenient analysis creates problems.  Perhaps the cases of Slovenia and 
Macedonia qualify as dissolutions, since the SFRY eventually acquiesced in 
their declarations of independence;27 but the same cannot be said of the 
independence moves by Croatia and, of course, Bosnia-Herzegovina because 
the SFRY did not exist at the time of their declarations.28  
                                                                                                                   
 23 The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States sets out the criteria for 
statehood: “a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity 
to enter into relations with other states.”  Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, 
Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. 
 24 See infra Part II.C.1.c. 
 25 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 1, 92 I.L.R. 162, 164–
46 (1991) [hereinafter Badinter Opinion]. 
 26 See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 400 (2d ed. 
2006) (noting that the Badinter Opinion found that the SFRY no longer existed). 
 27 Badinter Opinion, supra note 25, at 165. 
 28 See John Dugard & David Raič, The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of 
Secession, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 94, 123–32 (Marcelo G. Kohen 
ed., 2006) (discussing Croatia’s and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s secessionist claims). 
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How does Kosovo fit into the Badinter Commission’s analysis?  James 
Crawford, a leading international law jurist, and many other commentators 
give an incomplete account of Kosovo when they describe it only as having 
been “an autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia.”29  More 
accurately, Kosovo was an autonomous region existing not only within 
Serbia, but also, crucially, within the SFRY.30  In other words, the critical 
fact of Kosovo’s status was that it was a part of the entire SFRY, not simply 
that Serbia had some legal and administrative control over it.31  Crawford 
omits the crucial fact that Kosovo was an autonomous region within the 
SFRY.  In fact, Kosovo was in many respects independent of Serbia.  It 
participated in the federal governance of the SFRY and had considerable 
autonomy to administer its own affairs.32  Recognizing Kosovo’s critical 
relationship to the SFRY should have given Kosovo a strong case for 
separation at the time of the Badinter Opinion.  Kosovo’s legal status was 
continuously determined within the framework of the SFRY.33  Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence must relate to an entity from which it is seeking 
independence.  The fewer political and legal ties it has to the parent state, the 
better its claim to independence.  
What claims of sovereignty does the alleged parent state (Serbia) have 
over the claimant (Kosovo)?  According to some, the answer is “none.”  For 
example, legal analysts Jennifer Ober and Paul R. Williams, claim that  
[f]rom 1963 to date, the only country that has had a legitimate 
rule over Kosovo has been the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) . . . .  In light of the fact that Kosovo has 
never been legally incorporated into the Republic of Serbia, 
                                                                                                                   
 29 CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 408. 
 30 HEIKE KRIEGER, THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYTICAL 
DOCUMENTATION 1974–1999, at xxxi (2001). 
 31 Andreas Zimmermann & Carsten Stahn, Yugoslavia Territory, United Nations 
Trusteeship or Sovereign State—Reflections on the Current and Future Status of Kosovo, 70 
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 423, 425 (2001) (“Until the dismemberment of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1992, Kosovo was technically an autonomous province 
within the province of Serbia.”). 
 32 See generally TIM JUDAH, KOSOVO: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 42–54 (2008) 
(discussing Kosovo in Yugoslavia). 
 33 Serbia’s legal status was amorphous from 1992 to 2000.  However, what was clear was 
that Serbia could not claim rights on behalf of the SFRY.  Legality of Use of Force (Serb. and 
Montenegro v. U.K.), Summary, 2004 I.C.J. 26 (Dec. 15) (“[The Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’s] admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had, the 
effect of dating back to the time when the SFRY broke up and disappeared.”). 
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Serbia may make no claim to sovereignty over Kosovo, and 
can make no claim of territorial integrity.34 
However, a brief look at the history of the formation of the SFRY shows that 
this also is not an entirely accurate portrayal.  
During World War II, the communist leadership already had decided the 
basic structure of Yugoslavia as a federation of six republics.35  It thought 
that the two smaller regions, Kosovo and Vojvodina (an enclave within the 
territory of Serbia with a significant minority population of Hungarians36), 
were not ready to become republics.37   Kosovo and Vojvodina are different 
than the other regions because each had a significant ethnic population 
connected to another nation-state—Albania and Hungary, respectively.  The 
leaders even contemplated returning Kosovo to Albania.38  Montenegro and 
Macedonia both made bids for Kosovo, but Serbia seemed like the natural 
choice.39  In 1945, “the ‘People’s Assembly’ of Serbia . . . establish[ed] the 
‘Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija’, and declar[ed] that it was a 
‘constituent part’ of Serbia.”40  In 1963, a new constitution made moderate 
concessions to Kosovo’s autonomy, but Kosovo still remained under the 
authority of Serbia.41  In fact, some commentators argue that, “[f]or the first 
time, Kosovo’s constitutional status seemed to have been completely 
eliminated at the federal level and made a mere function of the internal 
arrangements of the republic of Serbia.”42 
In 1974, all of that changed for Kosovo when Yugoslavia 
constitutionalized the political gains that Kosovo made in its quest for 
autonomy.43  The new federal constitution gave Kosovo considerable 
autonomy, wherein it, along with Vojvodina, “became constituent 
components of the SFRY, with direct representation and voting rights on the 
major federal bodies, and were no longer subject to the legal jurisdiction of 
                                                                                                                   
 34 Jennifer Ober & Paul R. Williams, Is It True That There Is No Right of Self-
Determination for Kosova?, in THE CASE FOR KOSOVA: PASSAGE TO INDEPENDENCE 109, 116 
(Anna Di Lellio ed., 2006). 
 35 JOHN R. LAMPE, YUGOSLAVIA AS HISTORY 226 (1996). 
 36 Id. at 227. 
 37 Id. at 226.   
 38 JUDAH, supra note 32, at 31.   
 39 See NOEL MALCOLM, KOSOVO: A SHORT HISTORY 315 (1998) for a controversial but 
lucid and scholarly account of Kosovo’s complex history. 
 40 Id. at 316.  
 41 See MARC WELLER, THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO 1989–1999, at 52–53 (1999) for an account of 
Kosovo’s troubled years by a minority rights expert. 
 42 MALCOLM, supra note 39, at 324. 
 43 WELLER, supra note 41, at 54. 
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the Republic of Serbia within which they were still nominally located.”44  
Thus, the important issue is not, as thought by Crawford and similar 
commentators, over Kosovo’s failure to achieve complete autonomy as a 
republic; it is over the considerable degree of autonomy that Kosovo 
managed to achieve.  
What prevented Kosovo from achieving full status of a republic?  “In 
March 1989, with Kosova under emergency rule, both the Serbian parliament 
and Kosova’s intimidated provincial assembly passed constitutional 
amendments which restored Kosova to Serbian legal, political and economic 
control.”45  In 1990, Serb authorities dissolved Kosovo’s government and 
passed a new constitution that annulled Kosovo’s autonomous status.46  The 
legality of Serbia’s actions should have been questioned.  If the action of 
reducing or revoking Kosovo’s autonomy is tantamount to changing borders, 
then Milosovic’s moves violated Article 5 of the 1974 Constitution, requiring 
consent of all constituent parts of the SFRY.47  Serbia’s legal authority to 
revoke Kosovo’s autonomy is dubious, based on Article 301 of its 
Constitution, which states: “enacting legislation for the entire territory of the 
Serbian republic (i.e., including Vojvodina and Kosovo) [should be] on the 
basis of mutual agreement of the assemblies of all three units.”48  However, it 
is one thing to enact legislation and quite another to preempt the federal 
constitution by completely revamping the political status of a region, whose 
status depended on the federal grant.  Even if we make the highly 
questionable assumption that Serbia had the legal authority to revoke’s 
Kosovo’s autonomy, that move violated Serbia’s constitutional amendment 
XLVII section 2, adopted in 1989, which stated unequivocally that “the 
‘position, rights and duties’ of the autonomous provinces regulated by the 
federal constitution must not be altered by the Serbian Constitution.”49  Even 
more importantly, the denial of previously granted internal self-
                                                                                                                   
 44 ROBERT BIDELEUX & IAN JEFFRIES, THE BALKANS: A POST-COMMUNIST HISTORY 529 
(2007). 
 45 Id. at 532. 
 46 WELLER, supra note 41, at 59–64. 
 47 Peter Radan, Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opinions 
of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, 24 MELB. UNIV. L. REV. 50, 66 (2000) (“A border of 
the SFRY cannot be altered without the concurrence of all republics and autonomous 
provinces.” (quoting CONST. (1974), art. 5, sec. 3 (Yugoslavia))). 
 48 PEDRO RAMET, NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1963–1983, at 82 
(1984). 
 49 Joseph Marko, Kosovo—A Gordian Knot?, in GORDISCHER KNOTEN KOSOVO/A: 
DURCHSCHLAGEN ODER ENTWIRREN? 261, 265 (Joseph Marko ed., 1999), quoted in Carsten 
Stahn, Constitution without a State? Kosovo Under the United Nations Constitutional 
Framework for Self-Government, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 531, 533 n.10 (2001). 
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determination within a state should have been and should be a matter of 
international legal concern.50   
In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic, then-President of the Socialist Republic of 
Serbia, stripped Kosovo of the autonomy status it attained under Josip Broz 
Tito, Yugoslavia’s first president, from 1953 to 1974.51  Two organizations, 
the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosovo and the Writers 
Association of Kosovo, took the lead in establishing an underground civil 
society for Albanian Kosovars.52  Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, an aesthetician and 
literary historian, president of the Writers Association, became the leader of 
the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK).53  Beginning in 1991, the LDK 
led a pacifist movement for an independent and sovereign Kosovo.54  No one 
listened to the peaceful pleas of Kosovo’s leaders, and the 1995 Dayton 
Peace Accords also ignored Kosovo.55  In 1995 and 1996, sporadic terrorist 
acts took place.56  In 1997, the Kosovo Liberation Army, impatient with 
Rugova’s non-violent secessionist pleas, appeared again.57  Unfortunately for 
law and morality, the rest is history.  In 1999, NATO began a three month 
bombing campaign against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Given these historical developments, then, any claims that Serbia had on 
Kosovo were dependent on the respective parties’ relationships within the 
SFRY.  Once the SFRY dissolved, then the juridical relationship between 
Serbia and Kosovo dissolved or, minimally, it should have brought that 
relationship into question.  After all, Serbia, despite its protestations to the 
contrary, did not qualify as the successor state to the SFRY.58  Serbia did not 
have a right to give autonomy to Kosovo nor did it have a right to take it 
away.  
                                                                                                                   
 50 See infra Part II.D. 
 51 BIDELEUX & JEFFRIES, supra note 44, at 532. 
 52 HOWARD CLARK, CIVIL RESISTANCE IN KOSOVO 54–55 (2000). 
 53 JUDAH, supra note 32, at 72. 
 54 Id. at 70–71. 
 55 See generally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75, 89; Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Essay, 
The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
957 (1998) (attempting to understand the shortcomings of the Dayton Peace Agreement); 
David L. Phillips, Comprehensive Peace in the Balkans: The Kosovo Question, 18 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 821, 821 (1996) (criticizing the omission of Kosovo from the Dayton Peace Agreement). 
 56 See BIDELEUX & JEFFRIES, supra note 44, at 537. 
 57 Id. 
 58 The UN Security Council and the General Assembly rejected the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia’s claim that it was identical with the former SFRY.  S.C. Res. 777, para. 1, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/777 (Sept. 19, 1992); G.A. Res. 47/1, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (Sept. 19, 
1992). 
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There are advantages in beginning the inquiry with questions about the 
territorial status of the seceding claimant, for this may be the easiest issue for 
the court to assess since it only needs to examine the political history of the 
claimant.  Underlying the court’s analysis should be an assessment as to how 
state-like the claimant is.  Kosovo has little trouble getting over this 
threshold.  While Kosovo has experienced considerable growing pains over 
the past decade, it certainly now looks and acts like a state.  For example, 
except for some disputed boundaries, it has effective control over specifiable 
territory.59  As shown in the analysis below, the nature of the claimant might 
prove negatively determinative, as was the case of Biafra’s unsuccessful 
secessionist claims beginning in 1966.60  Further, the analysis focuses on the 
Kosovo territory and not on the Kosovo people.  In many analyses, “people” 
trumps “territory.”61  The approach below, in contrast, avoids the nearly 
impossible task and entanglement of figuring out what kind of people there 
are in the territory in question.  Are Kosovars colonial peoples?  Are 
Kosovar Albanians an ethnic group?  Fortunately, those questions can and 
should remain unanswered. 
Despite not having to determine what kind of people exist in Kosovo, one 
difficulty remains.  Whatever the legitimacy of Kosovo’s claim to 
independence in the early 1990s, that is no longer the issue.  Kosovo’s status 
as a political entity remains in legal limbo—the characterization of Kosovo’s 
juridical status between 1990 and the present remains unsettled.62  
Unfortunately, Kosovo accepted what should have been seen as its 
questionable relationship to Serbia.  Still, it is worth thinking about what 
could and should have been done. 
                                                                                                                   
 59 See Andreas Ernst, Fuzzy Governance: State-Building in Kosovo Since 1999 as 
Interaction Between International and Local Actors, 7 DEMOCRACY & SECURITY 123, 125–26 
(2011) (claiming that fuzzy governance resulted from the internationals and locals having 
different goals in state-building in Kosovo).   
 60 See infra Part II.C.1.c. 
 61 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 109–25 (1995) (tracing 
the history of the principle of self-determination as applied to colonial peoples). 
 62 See Richard Falk, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: Conflict Resolution and Precedent, 105 
AM. J. INT’L L. 50, 55–56 (2011) (“[Serbia] had clearly lost the advisory opinion battle, 
although not completely, as the majority never affirmed the independence of Kosovo or the 
current suitability of Kosovo for membership in the United Nations and other international 
institutions, or even whether Kosovo was entitled to diplomatic relations owing to its claimed 
status as a sovereign state.”). 
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1.  Case Studies 
Comparisons of Kosovo to other related cases, namely the Baltic States, 
Chechnya, and Biafra, bring together various strands of the analysis thus far.  
The case studies below will show just how the Kosovo case stands out.  First, 
the case of the Baltic States is one of unjust annexation, not secession.  
Second, the relationship between Russia and Chechnya is clearer than that 
between Serbia and Kosovo in that Russia was a successor state to the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), whereas Serbia was not a successor 
state to the SFRY.  Finally, unlike Biafra, Kosovo has the indices of 
statehood.  
  a.  Baltic States 
The establishment of the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) as 
independent states when the USSR collapsed constituted a case of a 
restoration of states.  The USSR unjustly denied their previous independent 
status when it annexed them in 1940.63  Although the Baltic States 
experienced some positive changes as parts of the USSR, those changes 
could not “alter the fact that the Baltic people have historically been, and 
continue to be, subjugated, dominated, and exploited.”64  For example, from 
the middle to the late 1940s, the USSR deported roughly 600,000 Balts (out 
of a total population of 6 million) to Siberia and elsewhere.65  Overt 
oppression allegedly ended in 1952.66 
In the 1990s, did the Baltic States, have what international law should 
recognize as a right to secession?67  No.  These were cases of unjust 
annexation, which must not be confused with secession.  An unjust 
annexation is a ground for a previously independent state to seek 
independence from its annexing state.68  Annexation is a restorative right, not 
                                                                                                                   
 63 The USSR illegally annexed the Baltic States—all independent before the 1940 
annexure.  CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 393. 
 64 William C. Allison V, Comment, Self-Determination and Recent Developments in the 
Baltic States, 19 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 625, 629 (1990–1991). 
 65 ALEXANDER R. ALEXIEV, DISSENT AND NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET BALTIC 3–6 (1983); 
see also Susan E. Himmer, The Achievement of Independence in the Baltic States and Its 
Justifications, 6 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 253, 265 (1992) (describing the “[t]housands” of 
deportations). 
 66 ALEXIEV, supra note 65, at 6. 
 67 According to Article 72 of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR, “[e]ach Union Republic 
shall retain the right freely to secede from the USSR.”  KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR art. 72 (1977) 
[KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION]. 
 68 CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 394. 
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a remedial one;69 it restores the status quo ante.  The Baltic States’ unjust 
annexation is different from the events in Kosovo; Serbia’s takeover of 
Kosovo did not constitute an unjust annexation, since Kosovo was not an 
independent state before Serbia’s effective occupation of Kosovo. 
  b.  Chechnya 
Chechnya poses a case closer to that of Kosovo, but there are also critical 
differences.  While Kosovo’s status became questionable with the dissolution 
of the SFRY, the same cannot be said of Chechnya with the dissolution of 
the USSR.  The international community recognized Russia as a successor 
state to the USSR, which, in turn, was a successor to the Russian Empire.70  
So, whatever the concerns over the treatment of Chechnya by Russia (and the 
USSR), Chechnya’s juridical status is not contested, certainly not to the 
degree that Kosovo’s status became problematic with the dissolution of the 
parent state, the SFRY.71  At this stage of the inquiry, the problem of 
Russia’s abrogation of its 1996 treaty that envisaged an independent 
Chechnya need not be addressed.72  
  c.  Biafra 
A territory needs the basic characteristics of a state in order to make a 
successful case for secession.73  The secession attempt by Biafra will serve as 
a case study throughout this Article to provide continuity.  For many reasons, 
Biafra did not have these indices of a state.  “Although Biafra had a 
government,”74 Biafra neither had, nor did it make any attempts to establish, 
an effective government.  Oversimplifying the events that preceded Biafra’s 
                                                                                                                   
 69 But see ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM 
FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 11 (1991), mistakenly treating annexation as a 
restorative right not as a remedial one.  He should decouple unjust annexation from secession; 
they are two entirely different matters. 
 70 CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 395. 
 71 See Thomas D. Grant, A Panel of Experts for Chechnya: Purposes and Prospects in 
Light of International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 115, 117 (1999) (“[N]o state to date has 
recognized Chechnya.”). 
 72 Khasavyourt Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual Relations, Russ.-Chechnya, 
Aug. 31, 1996, available at http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rus6.pdf 
(referring to “the universally recognised right of peoples to self-determination” and providing 
for a mutual agreement to be reached by December 31, 2001). 
 73 See supra note 23 (setting out the criteria for statehood). 
 74 David A. Ijalaye, Note and Comment, Was “Biafra” at Any Time a State in International 
Law?, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 553 (1971). 
2011]       REMEDIAL SECESSION  119 
 
ill-fated attempt at secession, there were electoral irregularities, followed by 
a national coup led by a military faction largely of Eastern Ibo origin, and a 
counter-coup, staged by Northern military officers.75  During that critical 
period, Biafra hardly had a history as a territory that sought some form of 
democratic autonomy.76 
More controversial—and perhaps less telling but nonetheless relevant—is 
the absence of other key characteristics of a nascent state, namely, a 
permanent population and a defined territory.77  While it had a permanent 
population, many of Biafra’s population group most relevant to the 
secessionist claim—the Ibo—resided in areas outside Biafra.78  In fact, “[i]t 
was not all that clear whether the Biafrans sought independence from Nigeria 
for the former Eastern Region or for the Ibos . . . who were scattered in other 
regions of Nigeria.”79  
D.  Internal Self-Determination  
The second stage of the inquiry proves most crucial when examining 
Kosovo’s claims.  At this stage, the court should make substantive 
assessments of the claimant’s status, including its relation to the parent state.  
The assessment has two distinct phases.  First, the court should examine the 
status of the claimant with regards to internal self-determination.  Second, 
the court should probe for harms perpetrated against the claimant by the 
parent state.  The next section sets forth the legal grounds for internal self-
determination—its basis in treaties, customary law, and judicial opinions.  
The subsequent sections establish a basis in international law for addressing 
certain kinds of harms, specifically those that violate peremptory norms. 
1.  International Law and Internal Self-Determination  
Hurst Hannum claimed that “the internal aspect of the right of self-
determination is the most important aspect of the right in the late twentieth 
                                                                                                                   
 75 M.G. Kaladharan Nayar, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context: Biafra in 
Retrospect, 10 TEX. INT’L L.J. 321, 322–23 (1975); see also LARRY DIAMOND, CLASS, 
ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA: THE FAILURE OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC 266–72 (1988) 
(using Nigeria as a case study to establish the general conditions for a stable democracy 
among developing countries).  
 76 Ijalaye, supra note 74, at 553.  
 77 Id.   
 78 M. Rafiqul Islam, Secessionist Self-Determination: Some Lessons from Katanga, Biafra 
and Bangladesh, 22 J. PEACE RES. 211, 214 (1985). 
 79 Id. 
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century.”80  The same is true in the twenty-first century as well.  For 
example, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides, “All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”81  However, 
self-determination, at first, took a legal backseat to the right to territorial 
integrity because states successfully promoted the idea that sovereignty 
constituted the linchpin of the international legal order.82  That is no longer 
the case because human rights and the rule of law no longer lie solely within 
the jurisdiction of states.  Indeed, as the following survey of various sources 
of international law demonstrates, international law supports internal self-
determination. 
  a.  Treaties 
The U.N. Charter contains two references to self-determination: Articles 
1(2) and 55.83  More explicitly, Common Article 1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights state: 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination.  By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of 
their natural wealth and resources without prejudice 
to any obligations arising out of international 
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of 
mutual benefit, and international law.  In no case may 
a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
3. The State Parties to the present Covenant, including 
those having responsibility for the administration of 
                                                                                                                   
 80 Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 34 (1993). 
 81 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 82 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 580 (7th ed. 2008). 
 83 According to Article 1(2), a purpose of the United Nations is the development of 
“friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.”  U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; see id. art. 55 (“With a view to the 
creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples . . . .”). 
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Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall 
promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in 
conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations.84 
Jurists often either reject or indicate skepticism toward external self-
determination and either support or speak favorably about internal self-
determination.85  Crawford, one of the foremost experts on these issues, 
interprets self-determination to refer to “the right of the people of a State to 
choose its own form of government without external intervention.”86  He 
infers that self-determination in the U.N. Charter could also mean the right of 
a people within a territory “to choose their own form of government 
irrespective of the wishes of the rest of the State of which that territory is a 
part.”87  Given a choice, Crawford opts for the former meaning and finds 
little or no support for the latter one;88 yet, he presents a false choice.  He 
conveniently ignores the language of Common Article 1, which clearly refers 
to right of people to choose their own government within their State—a right 
to internal self-determination.  This right is not so much concerned with 
external interference as with internal interference from a people’s own 
government.  How else can peoples “freely determine their political status”89 
if not within a state?  Crawford, however, does admit that the principle of 
self-determination could apply to a territory like Kosovo.90  He coined the 
term carence de souveraineté, meaning “entities part of a metropolitan State 
                                                                                                                   
 84 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, para.1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights art. 1, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 85 See, e.g., Johan D. van der Vyver, Self-Determination of the Peoples of Quebec Under 
International Law, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (2000) (“The concept of external self-
determination to denote secession, or depicting secession as ‘an offensive exercise of self-
determination,’ is therefore a contradiction in terms.” (footnote omitted)); Reference re 
Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 126 (Can.) [hereinafter Quebec Secession] 
(“The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a 
people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination . . . .”); Tamara Jaber, A Case 
for Kosovo? Self-Determination and Secession in the 21st Century, 15 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 926 
(2011) (concluding that “Kosovo cannot base its claim to statehood in a right to self-
determination” because of the difficulties of defining “peoples”).  
 86 See CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 114 (noting that internal self-determination is only 
implicitly referenced in the U.N. Charter). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 ICCPR, supra note 84, art. 1, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 84, art. 1, para. 1.  
 90 CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 126. 
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but that have been governed in such a way as to make them in effect non-
self-governing territories.”91  For Crawford, this is, at best, a principle and 
not a right.92  The subjects of rights are clearly defined in law, whereas those 
of principles are still an admixture of law and politics.93 
Self-determination became embedded in international law in 1960 with 
the passage of the U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples.94  According to the declaration, all peoples 
under colonial rule have the right to “freely determine their political 
status.”95  This right, however, has been interpreted narrowly in its 
application to colonial peoples.96  Documents, such as the 1970 U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution entitled “Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” (Declaration on Friendly 
Relations),97 indicate a willingness of the international community to extend 
the idea of peoples beyond the colonial context.98  The Declaration on 
Friendly Relations has been found to reflect customary international law.99  
The so-called safeguard clause in the Declaration on Friendly Relations 
provides one legal argument for a remedial right of secession.  The argument 
is that although the Declaration on Friendly Relations does not explicitly 
grant a right to secession, it does infer such a right.  The Declaration on 
Friendly Relations states that “[t]he establishment of a sovereign and 
independent State . . . or the emergence into any other political status freely 
determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-
determination by that people.”100  This language clearly suggests a right to 
                                                                                                                   
 91 Id.  
 92 Id. at 126–27. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. 
Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960). 
 95 Id. para. 2. 
 96 G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), Annex, princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541(XV) (Dec. 15, 1960) 
(“Chapter XI [of the U.N. Charter, Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories] 
should be applicable to territories which were then known to be of the colonial type.”). 
 97 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 
2625(XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly 
Relations]. 
 98 CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 118–21. 
 99 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, paras. 191, 193 (June 27) (applying the principles of the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations). 
 100 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 97, at 124. 
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internal self-determination.  Similarly, the Helsinki Final Act states that “all 
peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine . . . their internal 
and external political status.”101  Moreover, the saving clause in the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations reaffirms the principle of territorial 
integrity: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus 
possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed 
or colour.102  
Thus, presumably, territorial integrity remains intact as long as the State 
does not oppress a segment of its peoples.  If the State does violate the rights 
of some of its peoples, then those people would have a claim to impair 
territorial integrity by secession.  However, “the language of the saving 
clause seems to limit any possible entitlement to secede to racial and 
religious groups.”103  Finally, commentaries to CERD104 and to the ICCPR105 
confirm the right to internal self-determination.  In addition, there are the 
1975 Helsinki Final Act,106 the 1981 African Charter on Human Rights,107 
and the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action.108 
                                                                                                                   
 101 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act art. 1(a)(VIII), Aug. 1, 
1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act]. 
 102 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 97, at 124. 
 103 Daniel Fierstein, Note, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: An Incident Analysis of 
Legality, Policy and Future Implications, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 417, 429 n.87 (2008). 
 104 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 21, 
Right of Self-Determination, para. 4, U.N. Doc. CERD/48/Misc.7/Rev.3 (Aug. 23, 1996).  The 
Committee forged a link between the right to self-determination and “the right of every citizen 
to take part in the conduct of public affairs at any level.”  Id. 
 105 Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 12, Article 1 (Right to Self-
Determination), paras. 1–3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Mar. 13, 1994).  By virtue of the 
right to self-determination, peoples have the right to “freely determine their political status” 
and to enjoy the right to choose the form of their constitution or government.  The HRC found 
the right of citizens to participate directly in public affairs, guaranteed by Article 25 of the 
ICCPR, distinct but closely linked to the right to self-determination.  Id. para. 2. 
 106 Helsinki Final Act, supra note 101, art. 1(a)(VIII).  The Helsinki Final Act placed 
“additional constitutional judicial obligations” on the Soviet Union.  Boris Meissner, The 
Right of Self-Determination After Helsinki and Its Significance for the Baltic Nations, 13 CASE 
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  b.  Customary Law 
The exact nature of internal self-determination remains controversial, and 
whether there is a positive right in international law to internal self-
determination may be disputed.  However, there are an increasing number of 
international documents making direct or indirect reference to democracy, 
which seems to lie at the heart of internal self-determination.109  More 
importantly for this Article’s argument, international law clearly condemns 
the taking away of internal self-determination after it has been granted.  The 
U.N. has condemned regimes that blatantly deny a significant portion of its 
population internal self-determination.110  By examining the U.N. resolutions 
and legal opinions in the following cases, as well as the treaty and 
declaration provisions cited above,111 it is clear that the principle of internal 
self-determination has become customary law not only in decolonialization 
cases,112 but also in other cases—those concerning Rhodesia, South Africa, 
East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Haiti.  
                                                                                                                   
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 375, 383 (1981). 
 107 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 20, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 
217.  Perhaps, the African Charter extends, on a regional level, the right of political self-
determination to the right of economic self-determination.  See Richard N. Kiwanuka, Note 
and Comment, The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 80, 95–99 (1988) (attempting to clarify the meaning of “peoples” in 
the African Charter). 
 108 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 
12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration].  The Vienna Declaration extended the Declaration 
on Friendly Relations’ from application to “a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour” to application to “a 
Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of 
any kind.”  Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 97, at 124 (emphasis added); Vienna 
Declaration, supra, para. 2 (emphasis added); see also Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Comment, The 
Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 304, 306 (1994) 
(“Thus, the disclaimer referred to a government representing the whole people belonging to 
the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.”). 
 109 For example, 166 countries are parties to the ICCPR, supra note 84, with its Article 25 that 
guarantees a right to free elections and participation in public affairs.  Status of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (Nov. 28, 2011, 07:05:56 
EDT), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter= 
4&lang=en. 
 110 See, e.g., infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 111 See supra Part II.D.1.a. 
 112 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 121 (Oct. 16) (separate opinion of 
Judge Dillard) (“The pronouncements of the Court thus indicate, in my view, that a norm of 
international law has emerged applicable to the decolonization of those non-self-governing 
territories which are under the aegis of the United Nations.”). 
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In 1965, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith, leading the whites that 
made up only 6% of the population, unilaterally declared Rhodesia 
independent from the United Kingdom.113  Later that year, the U.N. General 
Assembly passed a resolution that condemned the perpetuation of minority 
rule as “incompatible with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination.”114  This was followed by a Security Council resolution, 
which was “the most recent expression of a general community concern to 
preserve that right [of self-determination] for [the people of Rhodesia].”115  
The Security Council condemned the government of Rhodesia and called 
upon the United Kingdom to restore internal self-determination.116 It then 
adopted sanctions against the regime.117 
The disenfranchisement of colored voters has a long, ignoble history in 
South Africa.118  The British colonial rulers severely limited the black 
franchise.119  However, after independent South Africa’s 1948 elections, 
apartheid became fully entrenched and institutionalized.120  It was only after 
the Sharpeville massacre in 1966 that the Security Council began to take 
action against the apartheid regime—for example, by imposing sanctions on 
it.121  For purposes of this analysis, the most important thing to note is that 
the U.N.’s condemnation of South Africa’s racism tied integrally to the 
South African government’s denial of internal self-determination.122 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The 
Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1968). 
 114 G.A. Res. 2012 (XX), para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/2012(XX) (Oct. 12, 1965). 
 115 McDougal & Reisman, supra note 113, at 19. 
 116 S.C. Res. 217, paras. 1, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965).  S.C. Resolution 217 
called upon the United Kingdom “to take immediate measures in order to allow the people of 
Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future.”  Id. para. 7.  S.C Resolution 232 reaffirmed 
“the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence [from 
minority rule].”  S.C. Res. 232, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 117 S.C. Res. 253, paras. 3–7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (May 29, 1968). 
 118 See, e.g., NIGEL WORDEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA 55–57 (3d ed. 2000) 
(discussing voting rights in South Africa and the connection to land ownership). 
 119 See LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 102 (1995) (describing the 
means by which the British oppressed the Blacks of South Africa throughout its colonial rule). 
 120 See Martin Legassick, Legislation, Ideology and Economy in Post-1948 South Africa, 1 J. 
S. AFR. STUD. 5, 5–6 (1974) (discussing the 1948 election and the victory of the nationalist 
Party, which was the turning point for apartheid legislation and the “separate development” 
ideology). 
 121 S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977). 
 122 “The issues of racism and self-determination are related. . . .  The South African system 
is particularly obnoxious . . . because the majority of South Africa’s people are denied any 
effective role in running the society in which they live.  That is, they are denied the right of 
self-determination.”  United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1984, 1984 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 405, 431 (Geoffrey Marston ed.) (quoting U.K. representative R. Fursland, Statement 
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The U.N. Security Council’s condemnation of the denial of internal self-
determination has been extended to other cases as well.  For example, 
Roland Rich, a political scientist, talks about a developing “limited doctrine 
of intervention in support of democratic entitlement.”123  He cites the 
interventions in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Haiti—all endorsed by 
Security Council resolutions—in support of this claim.124  Haiti was the first 
case where the Security Council authorized force to restore democracy.125  
Other cases were different.  For example, the U.N. General Assembly and 
the Security Council reaffirmed East Timor’s right to self-determination.126  
These examples show that, while it may be difficult to make a case for a 
right to internal self-determination in international law, an entirely different 
situation arises when a state grants and then takes away internal self-
determination from either its entire population or a part thereof.   
  c.  Judicial Opinions   
Opinions of the ICJ provide further support for this proposition.  In the 
Namibia Advisory Opinion, the ICJ held that “the subsequent development of 
international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determination 
applicable to all [nations].”127  At the time, South Africa administered 
                                                                                                                   
before the Third Committee of the General Assembly of the U.N. (Oct. 12, 1984)). 
 123 Roland Rich, Bringing Democracy into International Law, 12 J. DEMOCRACY, no. 3, 2001 
at 20, 31; see also Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 
AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 85–91 (1992) (arguing that the international community can only invoke 
collective enforcement measures against governments that oppress their peoples in limited 
circumstances); James Crawford, Democracy and International Law 1993 BRIT. Y.B INT’L L. 
113, 126–28 (discussing the problem with the idea that “democracy can be installed by the 
unilateral assertion of external force” and how external forces must be careful when 
attempting to intervene in order to establish a democracy because of the difficulties of 
establishing legitimacy). 
 124 Rich, supra note 123, at 31.  In the East Timor case, Resolution 1272 gave the U.N. 
Transitional Administration the mandate to develop local democratic institutions.  S.C. Res. 
1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).  In the Sierra Leone case, Resolution 1132 
demanded that the military junta “make way for the restoration of the democratically-elected 
Government.”  S.C. Res. 1132, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997).  Finally, in the 
Haitian case, Resolution 940 explicitly stated that the goal of the international community was 
“the restoration of democracy.”  S.C. Res. 940, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994). 
 125 S.C. Res. 940, supra note 124. 
 126 G.A. Res. 3485 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/ 3485(XXX) (Dec. 12, 1975); S.C. Res. 384, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/384 (Dec. 22, 1975). 
 127 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, para. 52 (June 21). 
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Namibia (former German South West Africa) by a mandate from the League 
of Nations following World War I.128  Namibia’s white minority had sole 
representation in South Africa’s whites-only Parliament.129  After World War 
II, South Africa refused to place Namibia under a trusteeship, which would 
have made it subject to closer international monitoring.130  This, of course, is 
the same South Africa that institutionalized the racist system of apartheid 
after World War II.131  The ICJ declared South Africa’s role in Namibia 
illegal.132 
The ICJ reaffirmed the principle of self-determination in the Western 
Sahara Case.133  Judge Dillard’s separate opinion most strongly affirmed 
internal self-determination: “It is for the people to determine the destiny of 
the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people.”134  In fact, in the 
Judge Castro’s separate opinion, he found the principles of self-
determination as a peremptory norm in international law based on a series of 
U.N. General Assembly resolutions and state practice of decolonization.135 
At stake in all of these cases is not so much the right to internal self-
determination as it is a right not to have internal self-determination 
obliterated or unjustly denied once it has been granted.136  The ICJ in the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion could have found a right not to be denied internal 
self-determination in international law within treaties, customary law, and 
judicial opinions.137  It did, at least, find that Resolution 1244138 was to 
establish institutions of self-government—“to establish, organize and oversee 
                                                                                                                   
 128 Treaty of Versailles art. 119, June 28, 1919, 1919 U.S.T. Lexis 7, 2 Bevans 43. 
 129 THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE 83 (John Dugard ed., 1973). 
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 137 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
T.S. No. 993 (listing the sources of international law the ICJ may use in settling disputes). 
 138 S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
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the development of local institutions of self-government in Kosovo under the 
aegis of the interim international presence.”139  
Most importantly, the focus on internal self-determination places the 
incentives exactly where they should be placed.  Full legal recognition of the 
value and primacy of internal self-determination within the context of 
debates and disputes over secession would serve as an incentive for potential 
claimants to pursue all avenues of internal self-determination before making 
any secessionist claims.  In the same vein, it would be in the best interest of 
the parent state to make as many concessions as feasible to demands for 
internal self-determination in order to undermine any secessionist claims. 
Jurists typically propose a final requirement on secession, namely, that 
secession represents the last resort, when no other alternatives are 
available.140  The Remedial Model’s requirement regarding internal self-
determination incorporates the spirit of the exhaustion-of-remedies 
formulations without accepting the pitfalls of adopting the letter of those 
formulations.  William Slomanson, a leading jurist, correctly points out the 
lost opportunities to settle the conflict amicably between Serbia and 
Kosovo.141  He bemoans Kosovo’s failure to cede some territory in northern 
Kosovo in return for Serb territories to Kosovo.142  However, there will 
always be room for pursuing more alternatives before taking a secession 
route.  The exhaustion of legal remedies is not the same as the exhaustion of 
political remedies.  What courts demand claimants do before pursuing a 
claim further differs from what claimants can do themselves to resolve 
disputes outside of the law.  For example, Serbia can continue to hold out the 
lure of autonomy measures for Kosovo. The issue is: at what point those 
autonomy offers cease to be given legal effect.  One answer is that they are 
no longer legally binding when they have been offset by gross human rights 
violations committed by the parent state against the claimant.143 
                                                                                                                   
 139 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 7, para. 98. 
 140 ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 355 (2004); 
CONTEXTUALIZING SECESSION 7 (Bruno Coppieters & Richard Sakwa eds., 2003); Michael P. 
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Violations in Search of a Rule, 6 MISKOLC J. INT’L L. 1, 20–22 (2009). 
 142 Id. at 20. 
 143 See infra Part II.E. 
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2.  Case Studies 
A great deal of the opposition to Kosovo’s UDL has come from those 
who fear that legally acknowledging Kosovo’s right to secession would set a 
bad precedent.144  However, the internal self-determination factor actually 
distinguishes Kosovo from a number of other cases.   
  a.  Bosnian Serbs 
The most relevant case to the situation in Kosovo is the Republika 
Srpska, now a political entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The ICJ has cited 
three situations in which the Security Council resolutions condemned 
unilateral declarations of independence.145  The ICJ dismissed these as not 
being determinative to the Kosovo Advisory Opinion because they apply 
only to specific situations.146  However, a common concern can be gleaned 
from these resolutions.  The Security Council did not want unilateral 
declarations of independence unduly and unjustifiably interfering with the 
development of internal self-determination.147  Consider the cases concerning 
the Bosnian Serbs and the Turkish Cypriots.148  With Resolution 787, the 
Security Council condemned any threat of unilateral secession by any party 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina while drafting an outline of a constitutional 
structure to govern the region.149  Similarly, Security Council Resolution 541 
condemned the attempt to establish the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
even before the international community had had a chance to broker a peace 
deal that would include internal self-determination.150  These cases indicate 
                                                                                                                   
 144 For example, a later case that may be affected by that type of acknowledgment is 
Russia’s support for secession efforts by South Ossetia.  See infra Part II.E.2.b. 
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 149 S.C. Res. 787, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (Nov. 16, 1992). 
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that the international community would look very unfavorably on any 
attempts by the Republika Srpska to follow Kosovo’s lead at declaring its 
own independence because now it has a working constitutional structure 
within which to operate and address its grievances.  The Republika Srpska, 
therefore, has a rather weak secessionist claim, in part, because it already has 
considerable internal self-determination. 
  b.  Biafra 
Biafra poses interesting challenges to using the doctrine of internal self-
determination as a factor in assessing secessionist claims.  Was Biafra’s self-
determination violated by the central government prior to its secessionist 
claims?  A brief foray into the history of Nigeria helps to answer that 
question.  In 1954, the British divided Nigeria into three somewhat 
autonomous regions—Western Nigeria (dominated by the Yoruba), Eastern 
Nigeria (dominated by the Ibo), and Northern Nigeria (dominated by the 
Hausa/Fulani).151  The attempt of the Eastern Region to secede was not a 
classical case of a thwarted attempt to attain internal self-determination.152  
First, the situation was one of successive military coups at the federal and 
regional levels.153  The war began with ethnic rivalry within the armed 
forces154—hardly the makings of a democratic movement.  Second, the 
secessionist war was, in part, a conflict over different visions of the state.155  
One vision held to the colonial construct of division into regions, whereas a 
competing vision had Nigeria divided up into states.156  In other words, it is 
difficult to see how efforts to achieve internal self-determination played a 
pivotal role in the conflict.  The secessionist movement of the Eastern 
Region was not so much an attempt of one region to remove itself from the 
whole but rather a competing vision of the nature of the whole.  One 
response to the continuing ethnic conflicts was to divide Nigeria into twelve 
states; another, taken by the Eastern Region, was to secede.157  
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 151 See Tunga Lergo, Deconstructing Ethnic Politics: The Emergence of a Fourth Force in 
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As demonstrated in this section, treaties, customary law, and judicial 
opinions can be used to show that it is against international law to deny a 
legitimate political entity the right to internal self-determination once it has 
been granted. Thus, Serbia violated international law when it denied Kosovo 
the right to internal self-determination granted to it by the SFRY.  
E.  Group Harms  
The other aspect of the status inquiry that should be undertaken by the 
court pertains to assessing the harms perpetrated against the claimant and its 
people by the purported parent state.  What harms would trigger a 
secessionist claim?  International law proscribes a set of harms as 
peremptory norms (jus cogens)158 that are universally prohibited; even 
sovereignty does not immunize any state from them.159  These harms 
generally include genocide, slavery, grave breaches, torture, and (perhaps) 
ethnic cleansing.160  Jurists have differed over the exact inventory of jus 
cogens provisions.  Oscar Schacther listed slavery, genocide, torture, mass 
murder, prolonged arbitrary imprisonment, systematic racial discrimination, 
and any other “gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights.”161  The commentary of the International Law Commission (ILC) 
notes that some members suggested “trade in slaves, piracy or genocide” as 
examples of jus cogens.162  The ILC gave illustrations rather than specific 
examples so as not to impose its own interpretation.  Other candidates 
include the prohibition of “ ‘crimes against humanity,’ the non-refoulement 
of refugees, [and] the illegality of unequal (or ‘leonine’) treaties.”163  
                                                                                                                   
 158 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331 (“A 
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Despite the disagreement over what to include on the list, few disagree 
over the inclusion of genocide and slavery.164  The international community 
already has made moral and legal progress by acknowledging the universal 
status of these prohibitions.  Genocide did not become a codified 
international crime until the ratification of the Genocide Convention.165  
Today, two ad hoc international war crimes tribunals and a subsequently 
established permanent one apply the preemptory prohibition against 
genocide.166  Genocide qualifies as the worst group harm because there are 
no viable justifications for it within any plausible moral system.  Under some 
carefully limited set of circumstances, there may be justification for other 
types of mass killings, such as civilian war deaths, in some plausible—in the 
sense that rational individuals may disagree about it—moral systems.  
Killing individuals because of their perceived group affiliation, however, is 
never morally defensible.167  Indeed, genocide qualifies as among the worst, 
if not the worst, universally proscribed harms. 
Within international law, the prohibition of derogation serves as a critical 
test for a peremptory norm, and genocide easily passes the test.  If states 
cannot find any justifiable excuse for derogating from a norm, then the norm 
qualifies as peremptory.  Hannikainen analyzes derogation grounds that do 
not serve as excuses for violating peremptory norms: “[d]erogation from 
peremptory norms on the ground of necessity, emergency, reprisal, or self-
defense, all of them being situations which allow deliberation before the 
action is taken, is not permitted.”168  None of these would qualify as an 
excuse for violating the prohibition against genocide.  If state officials have 
the slightest time for reflection, that state has no excuse for choosing 
genocide.  Citing an emergency would not suffice as an excuse for 
committing genocide. 
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It may seem that concerns about genocide have little to do with secession 
issues.  After all, the genocides that took place in Armenia, Germany, and 
Rwanda did not involve any secessionist claims.169  Yet, other harms connect 
to genocide.  Some other harms qualify as peremptory prohibitions, in part, 
due to their connection to genocide in that they have a probability of leading 
to genocide.  Ethnic cleansing, generally, is the “attempt[ ] to eliminate or 
greatly reduce the size of an ethnic or national group in order to achieve 
greater homogeneity within a territory.”170  Not all instances of ethnic 
cleansing constitute genocide.  However, forcibly moving mass numbers of 
people from their homes often serves as a prelude to genocide, that is, to 
killing of individuals because of their group affiliation.  It follows that the 
list of peremptory prohibitions relevant to the secessionist issue should 
include ethnic cleansing since it has a genocidal form and has the potential of 
leading to genocide. 
The connection of group harms to genocide is twofold.  First, lesser forms 
of group harm can, and do, lead to genocide.  Second, group harms have a 
definitional element common to genocide: the infliction of harm on 
individuals because of their perceived or actual group affiliation.  Secession 
claims made on the basis of group harm become matters of international 
concern, in part, because of their actual and potential connections to a 
universal prohibition against genocide.  All of the harms cited thus far 
contain a common ingredient: severe harms directed at individuals because 
of their perceived or actual group affiliation.  These prohibitions reflect an 
international recognition that severe forms of pain and suffering inflicted 
upon members of a group have a universal dimension and should not be 
tolerated.  To kill, enslave, torture, and uproot people because of their group 
membership undermines any sense of international morality.  The raison 
d’être of a moral international order is to protect people from the worst 
crimes. 
One further category of harm is needed to complete the analysis: group 
discriminatory harms.  These include deprivations of basic needs—such as 
food, clothing, housing, education, and employment—because of an 
individual’s group affiliation.171  Discriminatory harms often link to the 
harms prescribed in the peremptory norms of international law, but they form 
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a class distinct from genocide, ethnic cleansing, and the like.  For the most 
part, international law does not treat most discriminatory harms as 
peremptory primarily because it does not regard discriminatory harms as 
severe enough to warrant breaching the wall of sovereignty.172  A Remedial 
Model for secession must attend to discriminatory harms, not because their 
presence alone would justify secession, but because of the likelihood that 
widespread and severe occurrences of discriminatory harms would lead to 
the more severe forms of harm.  The combination of actual, severe 
discriminatory harms and the potential of genocide and its kin form a basis 
for justifying secession within international law and global morality. 
“Group harms” form a more specific category than “violations of human 
rights.” Group harms make up those violations of human rights targeted 
against members of a group because of their group affiliation.173  For 
instance, China has widespread human rights violations directed at 
dissidents,174 however, these violations do not constitute group harms since 
they are not directed at a group primarily because of their group status,175 
rather, they are, largely unjustly, aimed at individuals’ alleged actions or 
statements.176  State power unleashed against dissidents does not—although, 
under certain circumstances, it might—constitute status harms.177  Secession 
constitutes a remedy for group, not individual, harm.  However, secession 
rights are remedial rights, invoked by a group under limited conditions to 
rectify harms sustained by that group, not all citizens in general.178  
The right to secession itself is not a peremptory norm but rather a remedy 
of last resort.179  Peremptory norms, such as the universal prohibition against 
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genocide, transcend state boundaries.180  States do not have justifiable 
grounds for violating these preemptory norms, but they have many justifiable 
grounds for refusing secession.  A state places itself on a moral high ground 
when it resists the secession overtures of a group intent on creating a state 
that would violate a high level peremptory norm, such as the prohibition 
against genocide.  Whether the right to self-determination is peremptory 
proves more complicated.181  If it includes an unseverable right of secession, 
then the arguments above would disqualify it as a peremptory norm.  If we 
can separate a right to self-determination from a right of secession, then the 
analysis becomes more complicated. 
If we apply this analysis to Kosovo, we find that answers to questions 
about Kosovo’s status provide ample grounds for why the ICJ should not 
have taken Resolution 1244 as determinative.  If Serbia’s claim over Kosovo 
is questionable, if Serbia has been responsible for the denial of Kosovo’s 
internal self-determination, and if Serbia has been responsible for harms 
perpetrated against Kosovo that border on peremptory prohibitions, then it is 
difficult to interpret Resolution 1244 as in any way mandating the eventual 
return of Kosovo to Serbia’s control.182  Finally, it was not simply Serbia’s 
revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy that made the case for secession; it was 
also the repeated harms perpetrated by Serbia on the people of Kosovo.  
Once this harm element is factored in, the burden is shifted from the claimant 
on having attempted to effect internal self-determination.  This would then 
excuse Kosovo’s refusals to take up Serbia’s autonomy offers, assuming that 
they were made in good faith, after Kosovo effectively became a U.N. 
protectorate. 
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1.  Case Studies 
  a.  Quebec 
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada issued an important decision 
concerning the right of Quebec to secede.183  The court stated: 
 In summary, the international law right to self-determination 
only generates, at best, a right to external self-determination in 
situations of former colonies; where a people is oppressed, as 
for example under foreign military occupation; or where a 
definable group is denied meaningful access to government to 
pursue their political, economic, social and cultural 
development.184 
The court found that none of these conditions applied to the Quebec 
people.185  The people of Quebec do not qualify as colonial peoples.186  
Moreover, Quebec had not been denied internal self-determination, and the 
people of Quebec had not suffered oppression.187 
The court’s formulation comes close to the Remedial Model, but the latter 
condition offers greater clarity on a number of points.  The court seemed to 
see the forces of oppression as external and not internal.188  The court 
characterized the second condition as “where a people is subject to alien 
subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a colonial context.”189  
However, in its summary, the court used alien or foreign subjugation as an 
example and not as a defining characteristic.190  More importantly, the court 
glossed over a critical ingredient in most secession cases: internal 
oppression, particularly where the people are “the victim of attacks on its 
physical existence or integrity, or of a massive violation of its fundamental 
rights.”191  Given that the court used this internal oppression standard to 
evaluate whether the people of Quebec are oppressed, it stands to reason that 
the failure to include internal oppression was an unfortunate oversight.  
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Finally, while the court duly acknowledged the importance to a secession 
claim of denying internal self-determination,192 it failed to link that factor to 
oppression. 
The ICJ considered the question addressed in the Quebec Secession case 
to be significantly different from the one posed in the Kosovo case.193  The 
question faced by the Supreme Court of Canada was the following:  
 Does international law give the National Assembly, 
legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the 
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?  In this regard, 
is there a right to self-determination under international law 
that would give the National Assembly, legislature or 
government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of 
Quebec from Canada unilaterally?194  
If the issue was whether international law conferred an entitlement on 
entities situated within a state unilaterally to break away from it, then not 
only was the ICJ right to differentiate the question from the one it addressed, 
but also to answer in the negative.  A better formulation is to ask whether 
international law prohibits the denial of internal self-determination.  This 
section has argued that it does.  However, if that denial is not a peremptory 
norm, then the claimant only has a weak case for secession, unless that denial 
has been egregious and nearly absolute.  On the other hand, if the denial of 
internal self-determination combines with serious group harms, then the 
claimant has a strong secessionist case. 
b.  Biafra 
The Biafra case demonstrates the need for an international appraisal of 
group harm.  In May 1967, Biafra proclaimed secession from Nigeria,195 
initiating a thirty-month civil war that cost many lives.196  Severe harms 
directed at the Ibo preceded the secession demand.  In July 1966, hundreds of 
Ibo military officers and enlisted men were assassinated in retaliation for the 
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January 1966 coup of Ibo majors.  September to October 1966 marked the 
period of pogroms in northern Nigerian cities,197 resulting in the deaths of 
5,000 to 50,000 Ibos and the displacement of between 700,000 and 2 million 
Ibos.198 
The Biafra leadership engaged in a concerted effort to convince the 
international community that Biafrans were, and would continue to be, 
victims of genocide at the hands of the Nigerians.199  Did Biafrans 
experience severe group harms, actual and threatened, that mark a threshold 
where secession becomes a justified demand?  The multinational observer 
team, invited by the Federal Government of Nigeria, found no evidence of 
genocide,200 while the International Committee on the Investigation of 
Crimes of Genocide in Paris brought forth dramatic depositions describing 
mass killings of civilians.201  Although scholars generally agree with the 
conclusion that the charge of genocide remains unsubstantiated, the Biafra 
case illustrates the centrality of the issue of group harm in secession 
claims.202 
  2.  Cases Before and After Kosovo 
Two cases loom large over the Kosovo case.  Bangladesh is the first of 
these because, of all the cases before the Kosovo case, it most clearly meets 
the standards of remedial secession.203  Bangladesh does not stand as a legal 
precedent for Kosovo since it clearly was not presented as a case of secession 
at the time.204  However, it demonstrates a factual precedent—a kind of 
situation where the international community should have recognized a legal 
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right to secession.  The second case, involving South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
does the opposite; it highlights a case very different from Kosovo’s claims.205  
This is important because, politically, it is the case that might have proven 
the most troublesome if Kosovo had been granted a remedial right to 
secession.  However, as discussed below, Kosovo’s case would not set a 
worrisome precedent for South Ossetia or for similar claims.206 
 a.  Bangladesh  
The East Pakistan or Bangladesh case demonstrates a model case for what 
a remedial right to secession should have looked like.  The harms unfolded, 
beginning with discrimination and ending with mass displacement of 
people.207  After achieving independence from India in 1947 alongside West 
Pakistan, the Bengali majority in East Pakistan experienced a wave of 
internal colonialization at the hands of the non-Bengali-speaking West 
Pakistanis.208  For example, Pakistani elite launched a campaign to impose 
Urdu, on the East Pakistanis.209  Bengalis were poorly represented in the 
military and the civil service.210  Also, even though the East received more 
money for economic development than the West between 1965 and 1970, the 
West retained centralized control of the projects.211  Secession demands grew 
in 1970 when West Pakistan helped to annul an election, in which the 
Awami League received massive support for its autonomy proposals.212  As 
80,000 Pakistani troops amassed to quell the secession movement, “[t]en 
million refugees streamed across the Indian borders, the largest such 
movement in a single time and place in history.”213  The Pakistani army 
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reportedly killed millions of Bengalis, including many civilians.214  The U.N. 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, meeting in 1971, hastily rejected requests from twenty-two 
NGOs and the International Commission of Jurists to examine the 
situation.215  The intervention of India in December 1971 led to the formation 
of the new nation of Bangladesh.216  Perhaps if the East Pakistanis had an 
international means of addressing discriminatory claims and autonomy 
demands, the mass killings and displacements of individuals because of their 
group status could have been abated.  
East Pakistan clearly met the three conditions we have set forth for a 
remedial right to secession.  First, no one disputes the political division of 
Pakistan into West and East and the relationship between these parts, thereby 
passing217 the first test: Was East Pakistan a state-like territory that 
represented its people and sought independence from a parent state, which 
itself has a lawful claim on the claimant entity?  Indeed, East Pakistan was a 
recognized and legitimate part of West Pakistan.218  Second, did the claimant 
attempt to exercise internal self-determination and did the parent state 
seriously thwart those efforts?  West Pakistan clearly denied East Pakistan’s 
attempts to establish internal self-determination by annulling elections.  
Third, did the claimant suffer or was it threatened with harms that rose to the 
level of peremptory prohibitions?  West Pakistan committed crimes against 
East Pakistan that constituted violations of peremptory norms.219  While 
there are dangers in using one factual situation as a model, overall the more a 
situation resembles the plight of East Pakistan, the stronger its case for 
secession. 
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 b.  South Ossetia and Abkhazia  
Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia were autonomous regions within the 
USSR and semi-autonomous within the former Soviet Republic of 
Georgia.220  This political geography mirrors the status of Kosovo with the 
SFRY and Serbia.  After the breakup of the USSR, both regions experienced 
civil wars with their parent state of Georgia, as well as periodic interventions 
and current occupations by Russia, which saw itself as a peacemaker in the 
region.221  Both regions have become “effectively separated from the rest of 
Georgia.”222  The following three questions need to be posed to determine 
the legitimacy of the secessionist claims of South Ossetia and Abkhazia:  
1. Did Georgia have legitimate legal authority over 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia? 
2. Has Georgia seriously stifled autonomy measures and 
other attempts at internal self-determination by South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia? 
3. Has Georgia committed crimes that violate 
peremptory norms against South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia? 
Unlike Serbia’s current claim over Kosovo, Georgia has legitimate legal 
authority over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  South Ossetia is an autonomous 
administrative district, and Abkhazia is an autonomous republic within 
Georgia.223  While everyone thinks that atrocities have been committed on all 
sides, most analysts agree that Georgia’s actions have not risen to the level of 
committing violation of peremptory norms.224  However, the most critical 
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issue is autonomy.225  Georgia cannot have violated internal self-
determination when there have been few attempts to implement it.  
Admittedly, Georgia has stifled South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s attempts at 
external self-determination.  For example, Georgia withdrew South Ossetia’s 
autonomy status when, in 1990, South Ossetia declared independence.226  
However, the focus should be on internal self-determination.  In this case, 
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Georgia need to have demonstrated good faith 
efforts at internal self-determination.  This places the incentives exactly 
where they should be: on the parties to attempt to broker autonomy 
arrangements before any full-fledged secessionist claims are entertained.  
If the party or parties want secession sanctioned by international law, they 
must undertake good faith efforts to exert their internal rights to self-
determination.  If those efforts are suppressed and the parent state perpetrates 
further grave harms on the claimant, then international law should recognize 
their right to secede.  If the violations of the rights to internal self-
determination become so egregious that they amount to violations of 
peremptory norms, then they should have a legitimate appeal within 
international law.  In short, by adopting the Remedial Model, international 
law could actually play a role in averting conflicts.    
III.  COMPETING MODELS OF SECESSION 
Territories should not be permitted to secede merely because they have 
the wherewithal to do so.  Politically, a territory that is able to function like a 
state may successfully secede, but functionality should not lie at the heart of 
an internationally recognized legal right to secession (Functional Model).227  
Further, while cultures may be a good thing to preserve, cultural preservation 
should not be grounds for secession (Cultural Preservation Model).228  
Finally, economic disparity among regions of a state should not warrant 
secession (Economic Harms Model).229  The Remedial Model offers distinct 
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advantages over these competitors.  Basically, the Remedial Model focuses 
on two more fundamental values than these other models, namely, the right 
to internal self-determination and prohibitions against violations of 
peremptory norms.  Before examining each of these competing models in 
turn, this Part begins with showing how the Remedial Model constructed 
here fits into an overall rights framework. 
A.  Remedial Model 
Analyses of secession models fit into various categories.230  The one 
proposed in this Article is a remedial moral claim—right to secede.  The 
Remedial Model goes beyond proposing merely a liberty right to secede, 
which focuses on whether the right should be permitted.231  Instead, the 
Remedial Model invokes a stronger, moral right to secede, which, unlike a 
liberty right, places obligations on others not to interfere with the secession 
process.232  However, it goes one step further in proposing the right to secede 
as a claim-right.233  A claim-right creates not only a moral obligation not to 
interfere but also a legal obligation to establish the right to secede in two 
ways.  First, the international community needs to overcome the default 
presumption against secession.  Second, it needs to establish a means to 
assess and recognize secession claims within an international law 
framework.  Not all secessionist claims should be legitimized by 
international law, but some should be.  Most importantly, secession should 
be thought of as a remedial, as contrasted with a primary right.  Under the 
remedial view, “secession is justified only as a remedy of last resort for 
persistent and serious injustices.”234  Primary right theorists, in contrast, 
argue that a right to secession does not depend upon a finding of injustices.235  
They claim either that a right to secede can be made on ascriptive grounds, 
such as the nationality of the peoples claiming the right; on democratic, 
plebiscitary bases that reflect the preferences of peoples living within a 
territory; or on administrative grounds that simply assess the capability to 
function as an independent state.236 
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The Remedial Model contrasts most sharply with the ascriptive primary 
rights view.237  A group can be ascribed or determined according to certain 
characteristics such as age, nationality, race, and ethnicity.238  The type of 
group at stake in the secession debate cannot be a neutral, civic quality 
associated with membership in a state because the group claiming a right to 
secede makes that claim against a state—a claim to separate from a state.  
For example, Chechnya’s claim to a right to secede from Russia is not based 
on their membership in the Russian state; it is based on grounds of the group 
identity as Chechens.239  The same holds true of those who identify 
themselves as Quebecois within Canada.  However, as the Canadian 
Supreme Court recently found, ascriptive rights to group identity are 
insufficient grounds for a secession claim.240  It was not enough for the 
Quebecois to claim that they were a distinct group within Canada; the group 
also had to prove that it has been harmed.241 
Secession rights are remedial rights invoked by a group under limited 
conditions to rectify harms; they are not rights that apply to all citizens in 
general.  Philosopher Allen Buchanan has provided what is now regarded as 
the classic formulation of the remedial-rights justification for secession.242  
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His approach certainly represents an improvement over many attempts by 
philosophers to enter the fray of international law.  However, his proposal, as 
will be shown, proves woefully inadequate.  He proposes three grounds for a 
remedial right to secession: (1) “large-scale and persistent violation of basic 
human rights”; (2) unjust annexation; and (3) “in certain cases, the state’s 
persisting violation of agreements to accord a minority group limited self-
government within the states.”243  While the analysis offered here builds on 
Buchanan’s proposal, it differs from it in significant ways.  First, it provides 
a narrower interpretation of injustice244 than Buchanan’s proposal does 
(although his latter writings lean more favorably in the direction of this 
analysis than his previous ones).  Second, contrary to Buchanan, unjust 
annexation has nothing to do with secession.245  Third, Buchanan’s inclusion 
of autonomy needs to be recast in terms of a more fundamental right to 
internal self-determination.246  Fourth, an analysis of secessionist claims 
needs to flesh out a more exact idea of group harms that is critical in 
assessing secessionist claims.247 
The Remedial Model improves upon not only previous philosophical 
analyses but also legal ones.  It offers an elaboration and clarification of a 
position defended some time ago by Hurst Hannum, a law professor who 
authored a classic legal text on self-determination.248  Accordingly, to 
Hannum, the international community should support secession “if 
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reasonable demands for local self-government or minority rights have been 
arbitrarily rejected by a central government,” and when there have been 
“massive, discriminatory human rights violations, approaching the scale of 
genocide.”249  This Article has already spelled out what denials of internal 
self-determination and what human rights violations justify a right to 
secession.250  Indeed, internal self-determination has not played the role that 
it should in secessionist claims.  However, not every violation of human 
rights should be a basis for a secession claim; only grave ones (violations of 
peremptory norms) should be.  
Overall, an injustice theory, which focuses on the wrongs in the world, 
provides the framework for making sense and justifying secessionist 
claims.251  A classical justice approach guides us to achieving the good.  In 
contrast, an injustice focus centers the analysis on rectifying wrongs.252  
There may be disagreements over what types of groups deserve entitlements.  
However, greater agreements can be forged over what harms should not 
befall any group.  The Remedial Model focuses on injustices inflicted upon 
some peoples within a state. 
B.  Functional Model 
The following section outlines the justifications for adopting a Functional 
Model.  If a majority group occupying a definitive territory can administer 
itself efficiently, that alone should suffice as grounds for secession.  
“[A]nyone who properly values self-determination should defend the right to 
secede whenever both the separatist group and the remainder state would be 
able and willing to perform the requisite political functions.”253  A territorial 
group could demand secession on grounds that it can govern itself 
satisfactorily.  Good governance would include being able to protect citizens 
from foreign threats.  Secession under the Functional Model would not result 
in an unwieldy proliferation of states since only functionally efficient states 
would be able to secede.  At best, proliferation of secession-related harms is 
a potential worry, and, at worst, it has no basis in reality.  If a few smaller 
states result from secession movements amidst a sea of larger states, then that 
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should not provide overwhelming cause for concern.  Small states, such as 
Liechtenstein and Andorra, have fared well in Europe.  Alternatively, if 
secessionist movements proliferate and create a world community of small 
states, we have little past experience upon which to base our worries.  A 
world of small states may, for all we know, be more just than the current 
nation-state system.  
On the surface, the Functional Model does not create problems.  Territory 
B, which has the capability of performing efficiently as an independent state, 
wants to secede from State A, which brokers little opposition to the break-up.  
It sounds so simple.  The seemingly simple, however, can be horrifyingly 
complex, to which the case of the former Yugoslavia attests.  While the 
richness of the Remedial Model has been demonstrated in Part II by applying 
it to the complicated case of Kosovo’s secessionist claims, a less complicated 
example—the Slovak Republic—may help here. 
1.  Slovakia 
The case of the Slovaks illustrates a complicated relationship between the 
Functional and Remedial Models.  First of all, critics provide incomplete and 
misleading pictures of the Slovak case.254  Slovakia may have had justifiable 
grounds under the Functional Model for seceding from Czechoslovakia, but 
it did not have any strong group-harm grounds for seceding.  Nevertheless, 
the Slovak leaders put their case for secession largely in terms of group 
harms.255  Regarding group harm, the Slovaks justifiably could have claimed 
unfair treatment at the hands of the Czechs during the early 1920s.256  During 
that period, Czechoslovakia, forced by economic conditions, curtailed 
production by shutting down over two hundred Slovakian plants.257  
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Subsequently, however, the Slovaks fared well in comparison to the Czechs 
under the communist regime.258  For example, the Slovaks obtained “a 
roughly proportional share of the country’s production.”259  Although the 
Slovaks had a more agricultural economy in comparison to the more 
industrialized Czechs,260 the differences in the economies had not produced 
the kind of harms that would qualify the Slovaks as disadvantaged, and 
economic disparity between regions is not tantamount to discrimination 
against minorities.  The Slovaks demanded recognition within the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) as a disadvantaged, harmed group.  Yet, the 
Slovaks had a weak case for secession based on claims of group harm within 
the CSFR. 
In fact, the Slovaks were a powerful and privileged minority within the 
CSFR.  The CSFR had a population divided roughly among ten million 
Czechs and five million Slovaks.261  Within the CSFR, the Slovaks had 
gained a great deal of power despite their numerically minority status.262  
The Slovaks demanded parity in all legislative and executive decision-
making bodies on grounds of their minority status.263  The 1968 Constitution 
gave the Slovaks considerable protection.264  The bicameral legislature 
consisted of two houses: the Chamber of People, based strictly on 
population; and the Chamber of Nations, divided equally between seventy-
five Czechs and seventy-five Slovaks.265  Constitutional amendments 
required a three-fifths absolute majority in the lower chamber plus three-
fifths of each national group in the Chamber of Nations, giving veto power to 
the Slovaks.266  A minority vote of thirty-one could defeat constitutional 
amendments and other major legislative acts requiring a three-fifths majority, 
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and thirty-eight votes of no confidence could (and did) bring down the 
federal government.267  
The 1968 Federation Act also provided parity in office holding.268 The 
Constitutional Court had to be half Czech (six) and half Slovak (six)269 and 
the president and vice-president of the Court had to be from different 
republics.270  These structures largely remained intact following the October 
1989 Velvet Revolution, a nonviolent protest against the Soviet-backed 
communist rulers.271  They provided the minority Slovaks with considerable 
power and protection.  Herman Schwartz and Lloyd Cutler said that “[they] 
know of no democratic government anywhere in which comparable 
minorities of legislative bodies can have as much blocking power.”272  The 
only similar federal structure is Belgium’s ethnic division between the 
Walloons and the Flemish, but Belgium’s ethnic groups have enhanced 
political control only over matters of language and culture that directly affect 
them.273  Given their considerable power, harm and powerlessness are not 
qualities easily ascribed to the Slovaks in the CSFR. 
Historically, the main claim that Slovaks have for group harm is at the 
hands, not of the Czechs, but of the Hungarians, who severely curtailed the 
development of Slovak cultural and political life in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.274  For example, the Hungarians closed Slovak 
secondary schools, sharply restricted the Slovak voting rights, and did not 
provide for universal male suffrage.275  Comparatively, during the same 
period, the Czechs received somewhat benign treatment at the hands of the 
Austrians.276  For instance, in 1907, the Czechs attained universal male 
suffrage.277  The Czechs also had considerably more experience than did the 
Slovaks at civil service positions in the government, giving them a 
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significant edge in governmental experience.278  Overall, however, the 
Slovaks did not qualify as a harmed group within the CSFR.279  As one 
writer stated, “[N]owhere in the history of the coexistence of these two 
‘nations’ can one find a chapter similar to the Serb-Croatian scenario.”280  
Nevertheless, the Slovaks had the wherewithal to secede and to carry out the 
functions of governing after secession.281 
Does the Remedial Model presuppose the Functional Model? In other 
words, does the harm justification for secession depend upon an assurance 
that the claimant state can, in fact, perform the functions necessary for 
governance immediately following the secession?  The answer to these 
questions is a hesitant “no.”  Functionality should not be used as a legal 
condition for secession, however, it should be a factor in a legal assessment.  
After all, international law should not be responsible for upholding the right 
of a claimant to secede when that claimant will in all likelihood fail as a 
newly independent state.  The Remedial Model does integrate these concerns 
when it requires an assessment of the claimant’s relationship to the parent 
state and, more pointedly, when it assesses the claimant’s attempts at internal 
self-determination.  These attempts are often thwarted when the parent state 
is in crisis.  Potential failed states generally make little headway at internal 
self-determination. 
Secessionist movements often involve minorities within minorities.  For 
example, Slovakia has two significant minorities within its borders.  The 
Slovak Republic has a sizable Hungarian minority.  First, the Slovaks and 
Hungarians have a long history of bitterness toward one another.  In the 
1990s, the Slovak government’s actions against its Hungarian minority 
caused a great deal of saber rattling between it and neighboring Hungary.  
The Hungarians complained of not being able to use their last names first, of 
the potential elimination of Hungarian-only schools, and of Slovakian road 
signs.  The European Council, in response to the increased tension between 
Slovakia and Hungary, conditioned Slovakia’s application for European 
Union membership on Slovak assurances of protections for its Hungarian 
minority.282  However, the harms experienced by a second minority—the 
Roma—far exceed those claimed by the Hungarians.283  The Roma suffer a 
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disproportionately higher rate of poverty, unemployment, hate crimes, and 
disease.284  Both the Hungarians and the Roma, however, pose serious group 
harm issues for the Slovak Republic.  Actual and potential group harm issues 
should trigger regional and international involvement in any secession 
claims.  Even uncontested secession presents risks of group harm.  Buchanan 
correctly notes that “[t]he greater the risk, the stronger the case for subjecting 
the secessionist efforts to the rule of international law.”285  However, he 
incorrectly associates an uncontested secession with a risk-free one, as the 
Slovak case illustrates. 
There are obvious parallels between the Slovakia and Kosovo cases.  The 
territory of Kosovo contains a sizeable and vulnerable minority population, 
namely, the Serbs.  Kosovar Serbs have experienced considerable 
discrimination and violence while under the rule of Kosovar Albanians.  
Recently, Serbian churches, houses, and people have been attacked in 
sporadic incidents.286  This creates a worry about their future treatment under 
an independent Kosovo, just as the European Council worried over the 
treatment of Hungarians in an independent Slovak Republic.  This will 
always be a worry for anyone concerned with minority rights.  However, it is 
important to understand what the problem with a Serb minority in Kosovo is 
not.  The situation has not come to a point even approaching a case for 
secession of Northern Kosovo, where most Serbs reside.287 Serbia’s action 
against Kosovo clearly was state sponsored.  While the government of 
Kosovo might have responsibility for not having prevented violence against 
its Serbian minority, there is no evidence to suggest that it directly sponsored 
the violence.288  No doubt, Kosovo’s de facto independence will result in 
more violence against Serbs, however, Kosovo must deal with that prospect 
directly since Kosovo contains pockets of significant Serb populations 
throughout its territories. 
A far more vulnerable minority in Kosovo is a group that has received 
relatively little attention despite that their numbers almost equal those of 
Serbs.  Some of the direst situations that Kosovo Roma find themselves in 
are under the auspices of the U.N.  The U.N. sets and directs a housing 
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project in northern Mitrovica, where Roma live atop lead-infected slag heaps 
from a defunct mine.289  Kosovo at least has tried to address the plight of the 
Roma since its UDL.290   
This case study raises some troublesome issues.  Should the negative 
treatment of minorities by a seceding territory block its secession?  Should 
secession be conditioned on guarantees to protect minorities?  Perhaps, 
someday, international law will recognize minority protection as a 
peremptory norm.  However, it would be a major progressive step if, 
minimally, international law would fully adopt the Remedial Model of 
secession.  By doing so, the international community would at least go on 
record with a commitment to protect minorities from grave harms and to map 
out a secessionist road to alleviate those harms.  The first way to approach 
group harm problems within a seceding state is through minority protection 
measures within the new state and not as a condition for forming a state. 
C.  Cultural Preservation Model   
Should a territory have a right to secede to preserve its culture?  In the 
Cultural Preservation Model, the following conditions must be met:  
(1) The culture in question must in fact be imperiled.[291] (2) 
Less disruptive ways of preserving the culture . . . must be 
unavailable or inadequate. (3) The culture in question must 
meet minimal standards of justice . . . . (4) The seceding 
cultural group must not be seeking independence in order to 
establish an illiberal state, that is, one which fails to uphold 
basic individual civil and political rights, and from which free 
exit is denied. (5) Neither the state nor any third party can have 
a valid claim to the seceding territory.292 
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A prominent and still ongoing secession movement is found in the attempts 
to separate Quebec from Canada.  Culture has played a key role in this 
dispute. 
1.  Quebec  
According to some analysts, Quebec does not satisfy conditions (1), (2), 
and (5).293  However, conditions (1) and (2) are too vague.  If culture had a 
relatively clear-cut definition, then it would be easy to specify the imperiling 
factors needed to fulfill the first condition.  However, cultural unity depends 
considerably on subjective elements.  A great deal of what holds a culture 
together depends upon the collective mindset of the culture-bearers.  Many 
Quebecois find their culture imperiled.294  So, whether a state has taken 
sufficient measure to preserve a culture is not an empirical question, but 
rather is roughly measurable in objective terms.  The situation becomes 
further complicated by the fact that imperiling forces often serve to 
strengthen cultures, or, at least, to bolster the way people think about their 
culture.  With respect to condition (2), some Quebecois saw secession as the 
only alternative.295  In 1995, Quebec narrowly defeated a referendum for 
Quebec’ secession from Canada.296  If culture preservation makes up the goal 
of secession, then subjective factors become telling. 
However, cultural preservation alone does not justify secession.  Many 
aspects of a culture (but not all) and many cultures (but not all) merit 
preservation.  For example, a culture that engages in genocide would not be 
worthy of preservation.  Many of us (but not all) cherish the opportunity to 
observe and participate in the diverse activities of other groups.  However, 
the parenthetical qualifiers raise warning signals.  Passing over those cultures 
designated as “illiberal”—ones that violate liberal values of individual 
freedoms—poses more problems than it solves.297  How illiberal?  Does a 
single practice, such as female genital mutilation, make a culture illiberal?  
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Assuming we can fill in the details of conditions of illiberal cultures, further 
problems arise.  Preserving a culture is not an entirely innocent activity.  It 
involves a twofold homogenization process.  First, campaigns to preserve 
culture promote single interpretations of the culture.  Diversity within the 
culture becomes discouraged in the name of establishing or reestablishing the 
culture.  Second, bringing one culture into ascendancy tends to lead to 
devaluing other cultures.  The devaluation does not occur “by necessity.”  
However, when preserving a culture comes to the forefront of political and 
social consciousness, a culture strengthens relative to its proponents setting 
themselves apart from other cultures.298  Movements to preserve a culture do 
not always lead to more toleration of other cultures.299  
However interesting and valuable any given culture might be, no culture, 
in absence of harm, is valuable enough to trigger international protection of it 
through state secession.  To take an approach committed to the preservation 
of all cultures would place the international community in the unwelcome 
position of designating some cultures and their practices as worthy of 
protection and others as not as worthy.  Further, the quest to protect one 
culture may adversely affect another culture, resulting in a domino effect of 
unintended consequences.  For example, Quebec’s quest for an independent 
state may come at the expense of its indigenous Cree population, a tribe of 
indigenous peoples located in northern Quebec.300  This does not mean that, 
even in the absence of a strong showing of group harm, Quebec should be 
denied the possibility of secession.  If a referendum succeeds in Quebec, 
then, ceterus paribus, international law should not serve as an impediment to 
consensual secession.  Severe group harm should trigger international 
adjudicatory intervention and open the possibility of an internationally 
legally sanctioned remedy of secession following the steps outlined in the 
Remedial Model.  
The discussion thus far has assumed that we understand the meaning of 
culture.  What other grounds might demarcate one culture from another 
besides language?  Except for aspects of language, the secessionist case for 
Western Canada resembles Quebec’s.301  With its frontier mystique, a 
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kaleidoscopic population (French and English groups constitute less than 
50% of the population), stereotypic farm-hick-parochial-clod image, 
historical grievances (including, unlike other provinces, the denial of control 
over land and resources), and economic discrimination stemming from the 
National Policy of 1879, Western Canada has grounds to call itself a separate 
culture.302   
The case for cultural preservation strengthens when tied to group harm.  
If Quebec could show that its culture became imperiled because of a 
discriminatory disparate impact experienced by its citizens in their capacity 
as Quebecois and that group harm continues to manifest itself, then Quebec 
would have a stronger case for justifying secession than if it based its claim 
primarily on grounds of cultural preservation.  Whatever we might think 
about preserving a particular culture, the case for preservation becomes 
particularly acute when preservation is linked to systematic harm directed at 
the group.  Not all threats to a culture constitute harms.  For instance, Canada 
could refuse to provide enough funds for French films or could torture 
Quebecois because of their group affiliation.  The first activity might 
threaten Quebec’s culture; the second constitutes group harm.  Absent a 
showing of severe group harm, neither Quebec nor Western Canada has a 
strong case for a legally cognizable right to secession.  Surprisingly, the 
Crees do not have a particularly strong case of group harm vis-à-vis Quebec.  
The Crees have legitimate complaints against the Quebecois for past actions, 
but many of these have been rectified.303  The primary charge by the Crees 
against Quebec is the denial of their right of self-determination and their 
right to stay within Canada if Quebec seceded.304  The Crees have legitimate 
complaints.  The indigenous status of the Crees further complicates the case 
since international law has come to analyze indigenous peoples differently 
than, for example, minorities.  Nevertheless, the Crees would not have a 
strong group harm case. 
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Thus, the Remedial Model assimilates those aspects of cultural 
preservation that connect to harm and rejects claims that see culture as the 
sole or primary phenomenon in need of protection.  
D.  Economic Harms Model 
Are there other kinds of harms, other than the discriminatory harms used 
in the Remedial Model, that justify secession?  History has provided a 
number of secessionist claims based on alleged economic unfairness.  In 
these cases, one region will claim that it produces a significant portion of a 
country’s wealth without receiving back its rightful share from the central 
government.  Buchanan defined this discriminatory redistribution as 
“implementing taxation schemes or regulatory policies or economic 
programs that systematically work to the disadvantage of some groups, while 
benefiting others, in morally arbitrary ways.”305  He found that  
there may well be cases in which it is justifiable for the better 
off to secede simply in order to pursue their prosperity more 
effectively, unimpeded by the constraints that being in the 
same state with the worse off has imposed on them, without 
basing their justification for secession on any charge that they, 
the better off, have suffered injustice.306 
Buchanan cited two modern day examples where the Katangan and Biafran 
“haves” tried to sever ties from their respective “have-nots.”307 
1.  Katanga 
In 1960, the newly declared independent Republic of Congo immediately 
faced a secessionist movement by its southern-most province, Katanga.308  
With only 13% of the Congo’s population, Katanga had most of the 
country’s wealth.309  Yet, it “contributed 50 percent of the Congo’s total 
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revenues and received only 20 percent of total government expenditures.”310  
Katanga’s status as a wealthy region cannot be severed from past injustices, 
from its “unsavory associations with neocolonialism and mining interests.”311  
Katanga asked the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights to 
recognize its UDL.312  The Commission ruled:  
In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human 
rights to the point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should be 
called to question and in the absence of evidence that the 
people of Katanga are denied the right to participate in 
Government . . . the Commission holds the view that Katanga 
is obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is 
compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Zaire.313 
In other words, in the absence of a showing of denial of internal self-
determination and group harms, Katanga lost its secessionist bid.  The U.N. 
became immersed in the controversy, ultimately helping to stifle Katanga’s 
secessionist aspirations.314 
2.  Biafra  
Biafrans clearly held the wealth, especially relative to the rest of Nigeria.   
With only “22 percent of the Nigerian population, [Biafra] contributed 38 
percent of total revenues, and received back from the government only 14 
percent of those revenues.”315  The U.N. and the international community 
carefully avoided direct action in the Biafran war.316  However, upon closer 
inspection, the international community refused to aid directly the have-nots.  
For although the Biafrans held the wealth, the Ibo—the only Biafrans, 
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arguably, to have experienced group harm, and the only strong supporters of 
secession—did not.317  
Claims of economic misdistribution should not become legally 
enforceable grounds for secession.  Secession should be a tool to help 
remedy the plight of the disadvantaged under certain circumstances—it 
should not become another means to advance the cause of the advantaged. 
IV.  LEGAL FORUMS FOR SECESSIONIST CLAIMS 
As argued in the previous Part, none of the usual grounds for secession—
state administrative capability, preservation of culture, or economic harm—
successfully justifies a secessionist claim.  Rather, any adjudicatory regime 
for addressing secession must first focus on the harms alleged by the 
seceding territory.  What legal forums are there for adjudicating secessionist 
claims?  
Questions of self-determination and secession often resolve themselves in 
the political or military arenas with force playing a major role in the 
resolution.318  Do groups have any other way to resolve their disputes?  If 
groups have opportunities to express their grievances in an adjudicatory 
forum, perhaps there would be a drop in the incidences of group violence.  
However utopian, it is important to propose theoretical justifications for and 
structures of an international adjudicatory system.  Obviously, the world 
needs alternatives to violent group conflicts.  Could some groups have 
avoided the hatred and the violence if they had other avenues of expressing 
their grievances?  Perhaps those individuals who were discriminated against 
because of their perceived group affiliation could have found an international 
forum to hear their grievances when their state system failed them.  Perhaps 
an adjudication that took place outside the bounds of the state could sanction 
greater autonomy for the group within a state.  Perhaps an international 
judicial body could hear a case concerning secession before the grievances 
reached a breaking point. 
Pie-in-the-sky legalism is contrary to a realist position, which rules out 
morality, that sees little or no role for law in questions of secession or, for 
that matter, in issues of self-determination.319  Realists argue that states obey 
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international law only out of self-interest.320  Yet, appeals to law seem 
unavoidable, especially if “law” is defined broadly as a set of rules and 
mechanism for adjudicating disputes.  Adjudicatory institutions are well 
suited to make decisions about harms.  Thus, this Part explores the feasible 
judicial approaches to secessionist claims, other than the ICJ advisory 
opinion route that this Article has focused on so far.  Secession claims 
primarily have employed the language of law.321  Even if putting the claims 
in legal terms does not have a major impact on events, the resulting legal 
analyses should set the framework for evaluating the actions: Is a 
secessionist movement making legally and morally legitimate demands?  
Further, are those demands defensible within a justifiable theory of 
international law?  What are the legally cognizable moral grounds for 
secession?  What international institutions should adjudicate these claims? 
The answers to these questions lie partially in which grounds fail as 
justifications for secession.  Legal theorists were among the first to direct 
scholarly attention to the legal principles underlying secession.322  Political 
philosophers have recently devoted considerable attention to moral 
justifications of secession.323  Some have complained, however, that the 
current moral discussions have limited application.324  The Remedial Model 
meets the challenge by constructing morally sound principles that could be 
realistically implemented into international law.325  This pushes the 
discussion a step beyond where legal theorists and political philosophers 
have taken it thus far.  Theorists, to date, have only hinted at how to 
operationalize, within current international institutional structures, the moral 
justifications for secession.326  The relatively unknown Human Rights 
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Committee (HRC) holds promise as an arbiter of secession disputes, but the 
Committee for CERD can make an even stronger case. 
Before embarking on this ambitious project, there are concerns that the 
entire enterprise engages the issues too late (or too early), operates at a level 
too global and too unrealistic, and analyzes primarily historical rather than 
current cases.  First, critics claim that questions about secession for outsiders 
come either too late or too soon.327  Outsiders debate secession issues either 
after the fact (when it is too late to change) or before the fact (when it is too 
early for outside interference).328  In response to this concern, the Remedial 
Model attempts to stake out a middle ground by paving the way for 
secessionists’ claims to become part of a reasonable debate outside the 
confines of the state.  The project may begin to make more sense and to be 
more worth undertaking if secession issues are seen as occupying a middle 
ground between discrimination and genocide.  Although, however ineffective 
at present, some regional and international mechanisms already exist for 
addressing discrimination against a group outside the state where the 
discrimination takes place.329  Taking the next step toward entertaining 
secessionist’s claims just may prevent, lower the probability, or stave off the 
worst group harm—genocide.  Second, critics argue that an international 
focus on secession claims bypasses more effective and more realistic local 
and regional approaches to addressing the issues.330  However, the Remedial 
Model does not rule out similar or complementary approaches proposed at 
local, intrastate, or regional levels.  Whatever progress unfolds at other 
                                                                                                                   
institutional instantiation of his principles for secession.  He hints at the role of the World 
Court (the ICJ) but ignores the problem of overcoming the fact that Article 34 of the Court’s 
statute dictates that “[o]nly States may be parties in cases before the Court.”  Statute of the 
International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993; see 
generally Buchanan, Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law, supra note 242.   
 327 See generally Donald L. Horowitz, The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede, 14 
J. DEMOCRACY 5 (2003) (arguing that secession is rarely a sound option, that having a specific 
secession remedy available may hinder parties’ consideration of alternative resolutions, and 
that too limited a secession right may perpetuate oppression by allowing the majority’s 
hostility to continue so long that the minority seeks vengeance). 
 328 Id. 
 329 See LERNER, supra note 176, at 30–31 (noting that examples include: “[t]he European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 14), the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Preamble, Article II), the American 
Convention on Human Rights (Articles 1 and 24), and the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (Articles 2, 3, and 19)”). 
 330 See, e.g., Susanna Mancini, Rethinking the Boundaries of Democratic Secession: 
Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Right of Minorities to Self-Determination, 6 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 553, 581 (2008) (advocating the use of procedural secession, which allowed for the “velvet 
divorce” of the Czechs and the Slovaks). 
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levels, the international one plays a crucial role.  An international structure 
has the advantage of having less at stake in a secessionist issue by being the 
furthest removed from the conflict.  Third, a critic might charge that the 
analysis provided here is too remote because it concentrates on ethical 
justifications and on historical cases.  However, historical cases provide an 
opportunity to construct and defend a sound ethical and legal framework, 
providing the foundation for answers to current crises.  There are two viable 
U.N. treaty bodies that are likely places to begin implementing the Remedial 
Model.  While the HRC is more established, CERD has a stronger 
philosophical and legal basis for addressing secession and its attendant 
claims.  
A judicial approach to secession should be substantive and not merely 
procedural.  In a procedural model, a group need only meet specified 
procedure hurdles (for example, three quarters of the residents of the 
seceding territory must vote for secession after a designated waiting period) 
to invoke a right of secession.331  In a substantive model, a group must prove 
substantive claims, such as harm to its members.332  Contrary to the 
arguments of some commentators,333 courts are not more likely to exhibit a 
bias under the substantive than under the procedural model since national 
courts are creatures of the state whose sovereignty is challenged by 
substantive claims challenge.  Further, an external, regional, or international 
adjudication would more likely exhibit independence than an internal, state 
court since these would have less vested in the particular secession issue.  An 
international tribunal should adjudicate substantive secession claims, 
particularly since, presumably, it would have the least amount of vested 
interest in the controversy.  How could this take place within existing 
international structures?  Between the two most viable candidates—the HRC 
and CERD—among the human rights treaty bodies, the latter has a stronger 
case. 
                                                                                                                   
 331 See id. at 578 (noting the secession example of Serbia and Montenegro, which 
democratized secession and made it a legal, rather than political, issue). 
 332 Id. at 579. 
 333 For example, Buchanan sees the potential for biased referees as tipping the scales in 
favor of a procedural model of a constitutional right to secede over a substantive one.  
BUCHANAN, supra note 69, at 138–39.  But the independent-international mechanism 
proposed here would counter the biased referee problem.  
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A.  The Human Rights Committee 
The HRC, formed in 1977,334 has jurisdiction to hear complaints about the 
right to self-determination.335  States do not have representatives on the 
HRC, rather, states elect HRC members from a list of qualified nominees.336  
This gives the HRC some measure of independence from its sponsoring 
states.337  The HRC operates by consensus and issues opinions on 
complaints, although provisions exist for appending individual opinions to 
cases brought before the HRC.338  Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR states: “All peoples have the right of self-determination.  By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.”339  
Interpretations must operate within the confines of this language, and 
nothing precludes an expansive reading of “peoples,” that would take it 
outside of the colonial context.340  As developed thus far, self-determination 
has been developed in the context of decolonization, but that does not rule 
out a more expansive interpretation in the future.341  If a minority constituted 
a “people,” then it would qualify as a candidate for self-determination.  Once 
minorities are recognized, then the remedial road to secession begins with 
harms to them established under Article 26, which protects persons from 
discrimination342—most pointedly, harms that undermine the minority’s right 
to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.”343  In other words, secession could remedy 
harms that undermined internal self-determination.344  The structure of the 
                                                                                                                   
 334 ICCPR, supra note 84, art. 28 (“There shall be established a Human Rights 
Committee . . . .”); see generally YOGESH TYAGI, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2011) for a comprehensive study of the Human Rights 
Committee’s procedures and practices. 
 335 Robert McCorquodale, Human Rights and Self Determination, in THE NEW WORLD 
ORDER: SOVEREIGNTY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 9, 13 
(Mortimer Sellers ed., 1996). 
 336 ICCPR, supra note 84, arts. 28–32. 
 337 Rep. of Human Rights Comm. at 89, 53d Sess., Sept. 15, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/53/40 (1998).  
 338 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. 
 339 ICCPR, supra note 84, art. 1, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 84, art. 1, para. 1. 
 340 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (6th ed. 2008). 
 341 Id. 
 342 ICCPR, supra note 84, art. 26 (“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. . . .”). 
 343 Id. art. 1, para. 2. 
 344 See supra Part II.D. 
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HRC and the language of the ICCPR do not impede implementation of the 
Remedial Model.  
1.  Reporting  
Article 40 of the ICCPR requires states to report to the HRC, and this is 
the only reporting obligation states adopt after ratifying the ICCPR.345  State 
parties must describe measures taken to implement rights, including the right 
to self-determination, contained in Article 1 of the ICCPR.346  The ensuing 
constructive dialogue between the HRC and the reporting state347 could open 
a consideration of conditions for internal self-determination.  The HRC has 
established a five-year cycle for submitting reports after the first report after 
ratification.348  Supplemental reports could help to maintain the dialogue 
between a state and the HRC.349  Because the HRC has no fact-finding 
powers itself, it should make more extensive use of other agencies and of 
NGOs.  Although the HRC technically is not a part of the U.N., it does 
submit an annual report to the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. 
General Assembly.350  
To date, few countries have even referred to Article 1 in their reports and 
when they do, they only address the issues in vague terms.351  Specific 
recommendations need to be addressed to state parties.  The HRC continues 
to miss opportunities by providing only definitions and guidelines in its 
commentaries on the reports.  An indication of how a report could open a 
dialogue about potential secession issues came when Mrs. Higgins, during 
consideration of Senegal’s report, “ ‘sought more specific information about 
demands for autonomy in Casamance, which the Senegal government 
seemed inclined to interpret as a demand for secession that must be 
opposed.’ ”352  The report could open the doors to a discussion of a country’s 
minority problem. 
                                                                                                                   
 345 ICCPR, supra note 84, art. 40. 
 346 Id. arts. 1, 40. 
 347 Id. art. 40. 
 348 U.N. HRC, Decision on Periodicity, para. 2(a), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/19/Rev.1 (Aug. 26, 
1983).   
 349 The HRC can request supplemental information.  Human Rights Comm., Rules of 
Procedure of the Human Rights Comm., r. 71(2), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.9 (Jan. 13, 2011).  
 350 Id. r. 63; ICCPR, supra note 84, art. 45. 
 351 HANNUM, supra note 248, at 41. 
 352 DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 268 n.115 (1991) (citation 
omitted).   
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2.  Complaints 
The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which provides an inquiry and a 
complaints procedure, allows the HRC to hear individual complaints.353  The 
HRC has registered fewer than 600 communications in more than fifteen 
years of work.354  NGOs have not been granted the right to petition the 
HRC.355  While carrying considerable moral authority, the HRC issues 
nonbinding opinions (“views”) on complaints.356  An opinion includes “non-
binding recommendations.”357  Individual complaints of discrimination take 
on critical importance, particularly if failure to address them might engender 
recourse to violence. 
The HRC has rejected complaints by groups.  It came close to allowing 
group representatives to make group harm claims under the Optional 
Protocol in A.D. v. Canada.358  There, it denied the admissibility of the claim 
of the Grand Captain of the Mikmaq tribal society that the Mikmaq were 
denied the right of self-determination because of harmful policies inflicted 
upon them by the Canadian government.359  The HRC found that he had not 
been authorized to serve as a representative of the Mikmaq and that he had 
not demonstrated that he was personally a victim of any right protected by 
the ICCPR.360  The first part of the HRC’s approach makes good sense.  The 
HRC needs to determine whether someone truly represents the group.  
However, being a group representative does not entail personal injury.  The 
issue is not individual harm to the group representative, it is harm to 
members of the group because of their group status.  Unfortunately, in a 
subsequent case—Lubicon Lake—the HRC effectively severed the right of 
self-determination from the complaint process under the Optional 
Protocol.361  The HRC has moved to an interpretation whereby it regards the 
Optional Protocol as covering complaints by individuals qua individuals, 
                                                                                                                   
 353 Optional Protocol, supra note 338, art 1. 
 354 Jack Donnelly, The Past, The Present, and the Future Prospects, in INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 48, 55 (Milton J. Esman & Shibley Telhami eds., 
1995). 
 355 Id. 
 356 TYAGI, supra note 334, at 587–88. 
 357 Id. at 587. 
 358 A.D. v. Can., Human Rights Comm. Decision on Inadmissibility, at 200, U.N. Doc. 
A/39/40 (Sept. 20, 1984). 
 359 Id. 
 360 Id. 
 361 Lubicon Lake Band v. Can., Human Rights Comm. Views Under Article 5 Paragraph 4 
of the Optimal Protocol, at 1, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 A/45/40 (Mar. 26, 1990). 
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whereas Article 1 of the ICCPR deals with rights conferred upon people as 
such.362  Again, nothing precludes the HRC from rescinding this position and 
entertaining claims of harm to group members brought by group 
representatives. 
3.  Arbitration and Advisory Opinions 
The HRC can employ a two-step arbitration procedure.  First, the HRC 
can exercise its “good offices,” whereby the services of the HRC are offered 
to the parties in order to achieve a friendly solution to the dispute.363  Second, 
an ad hoc Conciliation Commission, “consist[ing] of five persons acceptable 
to the State Parties concerned,” can address the matter.364  Obviously, 
arbitration has great potential for preventing disputes from escalating into 
violence.  Unfortunately, the HRC does not have authority to issue advisory 
opinions.365  If the U.N. General Assembly has so authorized, “organs of the 
United Nations and specialized agencies . . . may also request advisory 
opinions of the [ICJ].”366  Provisional measures also can be sought from the 
ICJ.367  For example, in 2008, to preserve its rights under the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD),368 the Republic of Georgia filed a request from the ICJ to take 
provisional measures under Article 41 to use force against the Russian 
Federation for the latter’s role in ethnic discrimination and ethnic 
cleansing.369  The ICJ granted the request for provisional measures.370 
4.  Remedies   
The HRC does not have a sterling record of compliance with its 
decisions.371  “Until 31 July 2009, eleven State parties (Botswana, the CAR, 
                                                                                                                   
 362 Id. 
 363 ICCPR, supra note 84, art. 42, para. 1(a). 
 364 Id. para. 1(b). 
 365 TYAGI, supra note 334, at 587–88. 
 366 U.N. Charter art. 96. 
 367 Id. art. 40. 
 368 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 
21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD]. 
 369 Case Concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), 2008 I.C.J. 353, 355 (Oct. 15) [hereinafter 
Georgia ICJ Case]. 
 370 Id. para. 148. 
 371 Thomas Buergenthal, The U.N. Human Rights Committee, 2001 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. 
L. 341, 375 (Jochen A. Frowein & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds.) (“Roughly 30 per cent of the 
 
166  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:105 
 
the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Namibia, Panama, the Sudan, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Yemen and Zambia) failed to 
submit the requisite information.”372  In contrast, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Jamaica, Mauritius, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries have 
cooperated.  The HRC has not adopted any supervisory or enforcement 
mechanisms.  With this relatively dismal record, how can anyone expect the 
HRC to play an even greater role in international law, particularly with 
regard to a radical remedy like secession?  
The study of international law and international organizations has been 
plagued by the failure to dream.  The HRC receives little publicity, and its 
decisions have not stimulated many prescriptive discussions over what role it 
should play.  Grand dreams should be encouraged within the confines of 
detailed institutional mechanisms.  In this context, a secession remedy does 
not seem as far-fetched as it first looks.  The forces directing a group toward 
secession do not operate in isolation.  Lesser forms of discrimination often 
serve as early warning signs.  The state, for example, takes action against 
individuals because of their minority status by refusing them public housing.  
Recognizing the possibility of secession puts debates over remedying group 
harms in a new light.  It gives them a sense of importance and urgency.  
Secession comes as a remedy of last resort when other forms fail.  
Compliance with it depends upon the history of previous attempts to address 
the grounds for secession.  The opinion of an independent adjudicatory body 
like the HRC would lend credence to or help undermine support for a 
secessionist claim. 
B.  Committee on the Eradication of Racial Discrimination 
Human rights law seems like a hodgepodge of ad hoc measures cobbled 
together to make it look like the international community is responding to 
conflicts.  However, there is supposed to be an underlying logic and order to 
international law.  First, nations come together to agree on basic 
principles.373  The principles set forth in these declarations are aspirational, 
                                                                                                                   
replies received could be considered satisfactory in that they display the State party’s 
willingness to implement the Committee’s Views or to offer the applicant an appropriate 
remedy.”).  Follow-up procedures have improved since the HRC appointed one of its 
members as its Special Rapporteur for Follow-Up on Concluding Observations in 2002.  
TYAGI, supra note 334, at 264–68. 
 372 TYAGI, supra note 334, at 265. 
 373 U.N. General Assembly resolutions and declarations are not binding.  U.N. Charter arts. 
4, 10–12; see also GERHARD VON GLAHN & JAMES LARRY TAULBEE, LAW AMONG NATIONS 
399 (9th ed. 2010) (“As a General Assembly Resolution, the UDHR stands as a statement of 
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expressing the hopes and expectations of the direction that international law 
will take.374  Only when codified in the form of treaties, in the second stage, 
do these declarations of principles take on the force of law.375  Creating 
institutions to implement the treaties marks the final stage when nations sign 
onto optional protocols within a treaty. 
The adoption of ICERD followed this orderly progression.376  It was the 
first human rights treaty to codify a portion of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Rights, coming into force in 1969.377  ICERD, unanimously 
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 21, 1965, ranks as one 
of the most widely supported human rights treaties378—173 nations have 
ratified it.379  Further, it was the first human rights treaty to set up a 
monitoring mechanism.380  Its Committee (CERD) periodically reviews 
reports from the State Party members to the treaty.381  CERD has the shortest 
reporting period—two years—as compared to four or more years for other 
treaty monitoring bodies.382  Given this shorter reporting period, CERD 
examines a relatively large number of state reports each year.383 
Under Article 14, individuals may submit complaints to CERD.384  
Article 14 
establishes a procedure that makes it possible for an individual 
or a group of persons claiming to be the victim of racial 
                                                                                                                   
desired goals rather than black letter, substantive law.”). 
 374 GLAHN & TAULBEE, supra note 373, at 399. 
 375 The International Law Commission, created in 1947 by the U.N., which plays a critical 
role in drafting multilateral treaties, defines codification as “the more precise formulation and 
systematization of rules of international law in fields where there already has been extensive 
State practice, precedent and doctrine.”  U.N. Secretary-General, Survey of International Law, 
at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1/Rev.1 (Feb. 10, 1949). 
 376 ICERD, supra note 368; see Hadar Harris, Race Across Borders: The U.S. and ICERD, 
24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 61, 62–63 (2008) (examining the U.S. government’s actions with 
respect to CERD).  
 377 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, arts. 2, 7, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).  For an overview of the implementation of the ICERD, see 
Patrick Thornberry, Confronting Racial Discrimination: A CERD Perspective, 5 HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 239 (2005). 
 378 Vernellia R. Randall, Racial Discrimination in Health Care in the United States as a 
Violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 47 (2002). 
 379 Harris, supra note 376, at 62. 
 380 Id. 
 381 ICERD, supra note 368, arts. 8, 9. 
 382 HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 920 (3d ed. 2008). 
 383 Id. 
 384 ICERD, supra note 368, art. 14. 
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discrimination to lodge a complaint with the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination against the State 
concerned.  This may only be done if the State is a party to the 
Convention and has declared that it recognizes the competence 
of CERD to receive such complaints.385  
Fifty-three State Parties recognize the competence of CERD to hear 
individual complaints.386  ICERD also has a provision for state-to-state 
complaints.387  Unfortunately, CERD decides only a few cases each year.388 
Despite its name, ICERD does not attend only to racial discrimination.  
ICERD’s Article 1 contains a broad definition of discrimination:  
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on 
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life.389  
Given this broad definition of discrimination, it is not surprising that 
CERD has addressed a wide range of group harms, from the ethnic violence 
in Africa’s Great Lake Region to the illegal Israeli settlements in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories.390  Also, the standard recognized by CERD, 
since its inception, includes both intentional and disparate impact 
                                                                                                                   
 385 Article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination: Overview of Procedure, OFF. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/procedure.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2011); 
ICERD, supra note 368, art. 14. 
 386 THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 433 (Ruth Mackenzie et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
 387 ICERD, supra note 368, art. 11. 
 388 STEINER ET AL., supra note 382, at 920 (noting, for example that CERD only decided six 
cases in 2005 and 2006 combined). 
 389 ICERD, supra note 368, art. 1. 
 390 See MINORITY RIGHTS GRP. INT’L, SUBMISSION TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2011), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ 
ngos/MRGI_Rwanda_CERD78.pdf (an NGO shadow report on Rwanda); Comm. on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rep. on Measures Taken to Guarantee the Safety and 
Protection of the Palestinian Civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Israel. 05/03/1995, 
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/282 (May 3, 1995). 
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discrimination.391  CERD does not require proof of intentional or purposeful 
discrimination; the complaint merely needs to show discriminatory effect.392 
Some U.N. treaty bodies, such as the Committee Against Torture and the 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances, focus on certain kinds of harms 
such as discrimination,393 but CERD does not focus simply on one form of 
group harm.394  More importantly, CERD recognizes connections among 
group harms, ranging from discrimination to genocide.395  This has 
something to do with the origins of ICERD.  ICERD was introduced as a 
response to a wave of anti-Semitic incidents.396  CERD sees itself as charged 
with preventing and ending discrimination, ethnic cleansing, and other group 
harms that could turn into genocide.397  CERD has developed an early 
warning and urgent action procedure on patterns of oppression that may lead 
to greater violence or that may even slide toward genocide.398 
Many U.N. treaty bodies protect only certain kinds of groups,399 but 
CERD puts all individuals and groups under its protection.  As evidenced by 
some Concluding Observations and General Recommendations, CERD does 
not confine itself to concern for any one kind of group, such as minorities.400  
In fact, CERD does not cover a minority’s right to a distinct identity.401  
                                                                                                                   
 391 Audrey Daniel, The Intent Doctrine and CERD: How the United States Fails to Meet Its 
International Obligations in Racial Discrimination Jurisprudence, 4 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 
263, 269–70 (2011). 
 392 Id. at 264. 
 393 See Committee Against Torture, OFF. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., 
http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/cat/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011); Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances, OFF. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., http:// www.ohchr.org/ 
EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/CEDIndex.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
 394 Patrick Thornberry, Confronting Racial Discrimination: A CERD Perspective, 5 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 239, 250–52, 258–66 (2005).     
 395 ICERD, supra note 368, pmbl. 
 396 NATAN LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION 1 (1980). 
 397 ICERD, supra note 368, pmbl. 
 398 Rainer Grote, The Struggle for Minority Rights and Human Rights: Current Trends and 
Challenges, in INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY 221, 247 (Doris König et al. eds., 2008). 
 399 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN, http://www.un.org/ 
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/committee.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2011); Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, OFF. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/English/ 
bodies/crc/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2011); Committee on Migrant Workers, OFF. UNITED NATIONS 
HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/cmw/ (last visited Dec. 27, 
2011). 
 400 ICERD, supra note 368, art. 5. 
 401 The U.N. Declaration on Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities explicitly references minority identity in Article 1(1), “States shall 
protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic identity of 
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Rather, CERD sets out to protect all kinds of groups, be they minorities, 
women, non-citizens (including refugees, migrants, asylum seekers, 
displaced persons, detainees), or indigenous peoples.402  In short, CERD 
protects vulnerable or disadvantaged groups. CERD focuses on these 
vulnerable groups, in part, because they are particularly prone to genocide.  
CERD clearly has adopted the term “vulnerable groups” and rejected 
“marginal peoples.”403 
CERD also has addressed secession issues, albeit indirectly.  Georgia 
charged Russia with violating ICERD Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 by carrying 
out discriminatory actions against South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s ethnic 
Georgian population.404  “Georgia further alleged that Russia [sought] to 
consolidate changes in the ethnic composition [of these autonomous 
regions],” so as to lay a foundation for their respective unlawful 
secessions.405  For the first time, the ICJ took jurisdiction under ICERD and 
issued provisional measures to both parties.406  
Georgia’s case against Russia before the ICJ provides many of the 
elements for constructing an adjudicatory framework for addressing 
secession and related claims.  Granted, South Ossetia and Abkhazia did not 
seek independence from its parent state, Georgia, in the same way that 
Kosovo sought a ruling on the lawfulness of its UDL.  Instead, the case was 
about Georgia trying to offset or block what it claimed were unlawful 
external interferences against ethnic Georgians.  Nevertheless, all the 
earmarks of what a secession case would look like appear in that case. 
First, the case draws the outlines of an adjudicatory hierarchy, not with 
respect to lower and higher court rulings but with regard to interpretations.  
                                                                                                                   
minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion 
of that identity.”  G.A. Res. 47/135, art. 1, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (Dec. 18, 1992).  
There is no comparable provision in the ICERD. 
 402 ICERD, supra note 368, art. 5; see also Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination—General Recommendations, OFF. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. 
RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/cerd/comments.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2011) 
(CERD has issued thirty-four General Recommendations). 
 403 In its 2010 session examining Cameroon’s periodic reports, ICERD objected to 
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Georgia successfully argued that Article 22 of CERD407 permits an appeal 
regarding interpretations of the treaty in question to the ICJ.408  The HRC, on 
the other hand, does not have a comparable provision.409 
Second, the ICJ took a strong stance by granting provisional measures 
against Russia.410  The ICJ, in effect, ordered Russia to stop all forms of 
group harm, including ethnic cleansing.411  Also, among the human rights 
treaty bodies, CERD has distinguished itself as taking and adopting the 
strongest measures and remedies.  For example, CERD alone has instituted 
both early warning and urgent action devices.412  These actions taken by the 
ICJ and CERD show that international law indeed can use strong measures. 
Third, the ICJ’s provisional measures and the claims before CERD 
included recognition of the denial of self-determination as a discriminatory 
harm.413  While ICERD, unlike the ICCPR, does not contain a provision on 
the right of self-determination, the denial of self-determination certainly fits 
within the treaty’s anti-discrimination mandate.  Oddly enough, Georgia 
claimed that Russia had denied the right of self-determination of ethnic 
Georgians within South Ossetia and Abkhazia.414  However, it is just as 
plausible to imagine representatives of South Ossetia and Abkhazia bringing 
a similar individual complaint of denial of self-determination against 
Georgia.415  Interestingly, the violations ascribed to Russia are not put in 
terms of humanitarian law.  Rather, Russia allegedly committed violations of 
                                                                                                                   
 407 ICERD, supra note 368, art. 22 (“Any dispute between two or more States Parties with 
respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by 
negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the 
request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the [ICJ] for decision, unless the 
disputants agree to another mode of settlement.”). 
 408 Georgia ICJ Case, supra note 369, paras. 2, 117. 
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human rights law, or, more accurately in our terms, it stood charged with 
group harms.416  Of any of the human rights bodies, only CERD has 
attempted to find the connections between these harms. 
In conclusion, Georgia v. Russia contains all of the important elements of 
a secession case: (1) it addresses, although only in passing, the lawfulness of 
Georgia’s claims over the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; (2) it 
treats, however obliquely, the denial or thwarting of self-determination as a 
legally cognizable harm; and (3) it pays particular heed to all aspects of 
group harm, from discrimination to ethnic cleansing, and worries about the 
likelihood of genocide.  Although the case does not contain an explicit 
secessionist claim, it still encompasses all the ingredients of a secessionist 
case.  The basic difference between this case and a full-blown secessionist 
one lies in the remedy, which in this case is not independence but rather the 
cessation of external interference.  
Therefore, CERD is ideally suited for handling secessionist claims.  
While it does not have as active of a history of developing its jurisprudence 
as the HRC does, CERD has all the makings of a viable future forum. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Remedial Model, with its three-step inquiry, provides a morally and 
legally defensible way of addressing secession.  Before addressing the 
secession claim, relational issues must be resolved: What is the nature of the 
territory claiming secession, and what is its relation to the parent state?  The 
parent state must show that it has legal jurisdiction over the seceding 
territory.  This relational inquiry proves critical, particularly in cases where 
secession attempts occur in the midst of a state that is disintegrating. 
The Remedial Model also highlights two harms.  First, international law 
has consistently condemned states that remove internal self-determination 
from a portion of its citizenry.  By making internal self-determination the 
linchpin of secession, the Remedial Model correctly places the right 
incentives on states.  If states want to avoid secessionist claims attaining 
legitimacy in international law, they need to address demands for internal 
self-determination.  Finally, the Remedial Model treats secession as a form 
of humanitarian intervention.  If the seceding entity demonstrates violations 
of peremptory norms by the parent state, then secession provides a remedy of 
last resort that international law should recognize.  If a parent state has 
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denied internal self-determination and, for example, committed ethnic 
cleansing against its people, then secession provides a justifiable remedy. 
The relational questions raise interesting issues about Kosovo and Serbia.  
Surprisingly, Serbia has highly questionable claims over Kosovo.  Putting 
these concerns aside, Kosovo’s substantive claims prove strong.  Serbia 
removed progress that had been made with internal self-determination in 
Kosovo.  Finally, Serbia, through ethnic cleansing, committed violations of 
peremptory norms against Kosovo.  Unfortunately, the ICJ missed a rare 
opportunity to make a legal difference by adopting a Remedial Model.  No 
one should have any illusions that the Remedial Model will be warmly 
received and readily implemented.  However, recent conflicts make it 
imperative to take steps toward realizing the Remedial Model.  The failure to 
act more quickly in Bosnia-fed NATO intervention in Kosovo.  Yet, there 
was an even earlier failure.  If the international community had listened to 
secessionist rumblings in Kosovo earlier, there could probably have been an 
earlier and less violent intervention.  Kosovo pales in comparison to the 
current situation in a number of other areas around the globe.  The future 
cries out for an approach to secession that puts law and morality first. 
